

MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2

Operational Planning Team Guide



MAGTF Staff Training Program
(MSTP)

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MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2

Operational Planning Team Guide

This pamphlet supports the academic curricula of the Marine Air Ground
Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP).

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC
3300 Russell Road
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5069

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FOREWORD

1. **PURPOSE.** MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Guide*, is designed to assist the staff officer in establishing and conducting an operational planning team (OPT).
2. **SCOPE.** This pamphlet provides specific techniques and procedures for planning by the OPT. While the pamphlet is primarily focused at the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level, these techniques may be used by OPTs at Marine Corps component and major subordinate commands.
3. **SUPERSESSSION.** MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team (OPT) Facilitator's Guide* of 20 April 1998.
4. **CHANGES.** Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as from individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to:

Commanding General (C 54)
3300 Russell Road
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001

Recommendations may also be submitted electronically to:
opso@mstp.quantico.usmc.mil

5. **CERTIFICATION.** Reviewed and approved this date.

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Quantico, Virginia

Throughout this pamphlet, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either sex.

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Part I

Operational Planning Team

Integrated planning provides the commander and his staff a disciplined approach to planning that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough. It helps planners consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information. This approach to planning brings together the commander and his subordinate commanders, staff officers, and those subject matter experts necessary to develop comprehensive plans or orders. One of the ways a commander may conduct integrated planning is through the use of an operational planning team (OPT).

1001. Role

The primary role of the OPT is to support the commander in his decisionmaking process. The OPT provides this support by—

- Integrating the planning activities across the various echelons of the command.
- Synchronizing the warfighting functions throughout the battlespace to help the commander achieve unity of effort and focus.

The OPT is a task-organized planning element that supports the commander and his staff in decisionmaking. The OPT is not a substitute for normal staff action and coordination. The effective use of an OPT leads to the creation of an operation plan or order that is timely and flexible and that allows the commander to generate tempo, seize the initiative, take decisive action, and accomplish the mission.

The OPT must understand the planning activities at higher and adjacent headquarters to ensure the Marine commander's plans support and are coordinated with the other commands, plans. The OPT also synchronizes the planning activities of subordinate commands.

The OPT is a valuable tool for the commander to ensure that his operational planning is free of *stove piping*, or the unnecessary compartmentalization of information by various staff sections and functions. A well run and properly manned OPT helps to ensure all relevant planning information has been shared among the subordinate commanders and staff, and that the commander's plan has been thoroughly developed and rigorously tested by his staff.

1002. Organization

To best support the commander, the OPT must be task-organized for each planning problem. It may be organized based on the purpose of the planning, type of operation, or whether the commander is deploying, employing or redeploying its forces. For example, an OPT may be organized differently when planning a humanitarian assistance operation than for an offensive operation. A humanitarian assistance operation may require an OPT organized around logistics, engineer, and civil affairs personnel. An offensive operation may be organized around more traditional planners. The OPT may also expand or contract for each step of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPPE).

Higher levels of command such as the Marine Corps component, Marine expeditionary force (MEF) or major subordinate commands, like the aircraft wing or force service support group, have separate planning staffs. In these organizations, the OPT is normally built around a core of planners from the future operations or future plans sections. Whether the OPT is formed around future operations or future plans depends on where the command is in the planning continuum. If an operation is still in the conceptual stage at the higher headquarters, future plans may take the lead and provide the core for the OPT. If planning is well along at higher headquarters or the command has received a mission, future operations normally forms the core of the OPT.

The OPT consists of the future operations or future plans core, representatives from the principle and special staff sections, and subject matter experts as dictated by mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T). All members of the OPT should be of appropriate rank, be knowledgeable in their functional area, and be well-versed in the MCPPE. Additionally, liaison officers (LNO) from

subordinate, adjacent, and supporting commands participate in the OPT. Regardless of the composition of the OPT, there must always be representatives with expertise in the six warfighting functions. OPT members can act in more than one capacity; for instance the G-3 representative could also be the maneuver representative, or the G-4 representative could be the logistics representative. See figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1. Operational planning team organization.

At higher levels of command, or when planning complex operations, the OPT could be composed of 40-50 members. While large groups are good for gathering information and gaining situational awareness, it is not conducive to working details and making decisions in a timely manner. There will be times when a small group of members must break away to work on details and make recommendations to the commander. This small group of members is the *core*. Members of the core will generally come from the future operations section and various other staff sections (e.g., the G-2 plans officer, G-3 force fires officers, G-4 plans officer, and G-6 plans officer). For illustration, the OPT will be built around the future operations section. Future operations will have a future operations officer, one or more assistants, an operations chief, and some clerks. The value of the operations chief and clerks cannot be overemphasized. Well-trained noncommissioned officers relieve the OPT facilitators from routine tasks such as briefing slide preparation, C2PC graphics, and administrative tasks.

The primary skill of a core member is to be a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) officer. Core members must be able to think beyond their specialty. They should be generalists who can see and understand the big picture, yet have a mastery of tactical fundamentals and understand the capabilities and limitations of both the MAGTF and the enemy. The core members must also be able to think at their commander's level.

At lower levels of command, such as Marine expeditionary units, regiments, aircraft groups, battalions, squadrons, and combat service support units, there are no separate planning sections within the staff. In these organizations, an OPT might be comprised of the commander, executive officer, key staff officers (S-2, S-3, S-4, S-6, fire support coordinator), and other subject matter experts as required by the mission.

a. Operational Planning Team Leader

The G-3 future operations officer is normally the OPT leader. He ensures that the OPT follows the commander's guidance throughout the planning process and tailors the process to support the commander and the situation. He is responsible for establishing and managing the OPT's battle rhythm and the products that the OPT develops.

The OPT leader is the decisionmaker—the final arbiter—in the OPT. He should be an expert in the use of the MCPP, and someone the commander trusts implicitly. The OPT leader interacts with the commander, deputy, chief of staff, and other principal staff officers.

b. Assistant Operational Planning Team Leaders

Depending on the size of the OPT or the complexity of the operations, there may be more than one assistant OPT leader. The assistant future operations officers will normally be assistant OPT leaders. The assistant OPT leaders coordinate the OPT's processes, create a common understanding, and help the OPT come to agreement. They are normally designated as facilitators, and can also act as information managers, or recorders.

- **Facilitator.** The OPT facilitator directs and supervises the activities of the OPT. He ensures all personnel participate in the process at the proper time.
- **Information Manager.** The information manager handles and posts all information and requests for information. The OPT can

product a vast amount of information. The information manager is responsible for ensuring that the OPT records, tracks and posts information in a logical sequence to aid the planning process. He coordinates with the command's information management officer to ensure the smooth flow of information within the unit.

- **Recorder.** The recorder captures the key points during planning, especially wargaming. He is also responsible for recording the discussions with the commander. A record of these conversations is critical to ensure that the OPT is following the commander's guidance.

c. Staff Representatives

The staff representative is normally the plans officer for the section. He must be thoroughly familiar with the planning process. The staff representative is the communication link between the OPT and his principal staff officer. He must anticipate the needs of the OPT and task the experts in his staff section to provide information on time and in the correct format. The staff representative must synthesize all the details from his staff section so that the other members of the OPT understand the information. Finally, he must be able to think across the warfighting functions.

Each staff section should have representatives on the OPT. To maintain situational awareness of the ongoing operations, it is important for the OPT to have a current operations representative.

d. Subject Matter Experts

Subject matter experts are normally from the staff, subordinate, supporting, and adjacent commands, as well as from other departmental agencies (e.g., Office of Foreign Disaster Relief, Federal Emergency Management Agency). These individuals provide their specific knowledge to the OPT when requested. Using "reach back" technology such as video teleconferencing and wide area networks, out of theater or continental U.S. based subject matter experts may also support the OPT.

e. Support Personnel

The future operations chief and clerks have a vital role in the OPT. They do the detailed routine work required for an efficient operation. They free the remainder of the OPT to plan and discuss issues.

Most importantly, the support personnel provide the information technology support to build and maintain web pages, overlays, briefs, and warning orders. They must be proficient on various systems and programs including Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC), Microsoft PowerPoint, and Microsoft Word.

f. Liaison Officers

While not members of the OPT, LNOs—representing higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting commanders—are essential participants in the OPT. LNOs should be knowledgeable in their parent organization’s capabilities and limitations and be familiar with their commander’s intent and concept of operations.

LNOs do not work for the OPT leader—they work for their unit commander. The OPT leader must remember this and ensure that the LNOs have the time and means to remain in contact with their parent command.

1003. Operational Planning Team and Staff Relationship

The OPT is usually formed around a core of planners from the future operations section of the G-3. While the G-3 is normally responsible for the functioning of the OPT, the OPT is more than just a function of future operations. The OPT is the commander’s tool for integrated planning. He uses it to fuse the planning effort of his entire staff. (Remember, the OPT is responsible for ensuring integrated planning occurs while the staffs are responsible for normal staff action and coordination.) All staff sections provide planners to the OPT. For example, the G-4 provides the logistics planners and the G-5 provides planners from the future plans section.

The OPT fully integrates the other staff sections’ plans officers and subordinate, adjacent, and supporting unit LNOs into the planning process. It helps to transition the approved operation plan or order to the current operations section for execution. See figure 1-2.




Figure 1-2. Staff relationships.

a. Commander

The most important relationship is between the commander and the OPT. To support the commander’s decisionmaking process, the OPT must know how the commander makes decisions. How does the commander think? Is he analytical or intuitive? What normally concerns him? What normally does not concern him? Does the commander want information displayed graphically, textually, or both?

b. Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Next in importance is the relationships between the OPT and the deputy commander, and then the OPT and the chief of staff. The commander may delegate certain functions to the deputy commander. The deputy commander may also pass information and instructions to the OPT from the commander.

The chief of staff directs, coordinates, and supervises the battle staff. He ensures that the staff participates with the OPT in the planning effort, establishes the command’s battle rhythm, and is briefed by the OPT before the commander. In addition to his authority over the staff, he too can receive and pass the commander’s decisions to the OPT.

c. Battle Staff and Staff Representatives

The OPT leader must understand that the battle staff is performing four simultaneous functions. First and foremost, they are supporting the commander's decisionmaking process. Next, they are supporting the current operation. Third, they are participating in the OPT. Finally, they are coordinating with their staff counterparts at higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting headquarters. See Appendix A for more information on the role of the battle staff during planning.

d. Liaison Officers

The LNO is his commander's personal representative and link to the OPT. The LNO is the conduit to pass information from and to his commander. He will make appropriate recommendations and estimates, as well as relay his commander's concerns to the OPT. One of the most important pieces of information that the LNO can pass is the current and projected capability of his command. The OPT leader must allow sufficient time for the LNOs to communicate with their commanders.

e. Other Planning Organizations

The OPT must also understand its relationship with the other planning organizations in the MEF. See figure 1-3.




Figure 1-3. Planning relationships.

- **Future Plans.** The future plans section is under the staff cognizance of the G-5. The G-5 sends a liaison element to the higher headquarters' staff to integrate the higher headquarters plan into the MEF's planning process. The future plans section advises higher headquarters on the MEF's projected capabilities and sets the conditions for the MEF's next mission. This assists the higher commander in assigning missions, tasks, command relationships, and battlespace appropriate to the MEF. The future plans section may also provide liaison teams to adjacent units. These liaison elements keep the OPT, and the adjacent units, informed about events around them.
- **Intelligence Operations Center.** The intelligence operations center (IOC) is under the staff cognizance of the G-2. Intelligence personnel in the IOC analyze the enemy, terrain, and weather. They must know the OPT's time lines and what intelligence products the OPT requires. This is critical for the OPT to maintain planning tempo. For example, the G-2 must develop enemy courses of action (COAs) before the OPT develops the friendly COAs so they can focus on the enemy during COA development. The primary link between the OPT and personnel in the IOC is the G-2 representative in the OPT.
- **Current Operations.** The current operations section is under the staff cognizance of the G-3. Current operations is the OPT's link to understanding the current situation. The OPT must work closely with current operations to ensure the OPT has the most up-to-date information on ongoing operations and other issues that will have a bearing on the plan under development. The OPT needs to know the command's current capabilities in order to project forward. The current operations representative in the OPT provides the link between the OPT and current operations.

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Part II

Preparations

From the first meeting of the OPT, all members—staff representatives, subject matter experts, and LNOs—must be fully prepared to conduct planning immediately. This requires that the members must have thoroughly studied the higher headquarters operation order. Members must have read and understand the planning theories and procedures contained in MCDP 5, *Planning*, and MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*. They must also bring—or have access to—other references, relevant planning factors, and materials necessary to perform their functions. (See para. 2002 for a list of suggested references.)

Ideally, the OPT should be provided a facility that is dedicated solely for its use. This facility must be large enough to accommodate all members and have sufficient voice and data connectivity.

2001. Guidelines

The following points may assist the OPT in conducting effective planning sessions. See Appendix B for specific major subordinate command OPT considerations.

- Ensure all members are present and understand their role in the OPT.
- Allow everyone time to read orders, background, and standing operating procedures (SOPs).
- Establish and adhere to a detailed time line. Do not lose track of time—or let it control the OPT. Designate a time keeper.
- Use reverse planning. Establish the end state, then timeline backwards.
- Post the mission statements and commander's intents for the commands two levels up.
- Post a map of the proper scale that includes the entire battlespace (include the area of interest).

- Post pertinent planning products where they can be easily seen. This is an effective means for sharing information. Keeping information on a computer does not build situational awareness.
- Post pertinent planning methodologies such as COA development, war game rules, etc.
- Post pertinent planning factors such as friendly and enemy organization and equipment, movement rates, consumption rates, etc.
- Record all issues, questions, and responses; post them for all to see.
- Have issues posted next to the map so that if the commander comes by he can be briefed. If some of the products are ready (essential tasks, mission statement, etc.) do not wait for a formal brief to show them to him.
- If the OPT has an issue that is a showstopper, then resolve it. If the issue is not essential, raise it, record it, and continue.
- Ensure proper use of terminology especially during assignment of tactical tasks and fires effects. Assign a member to be the terminologist. See Appendix C and D.
- Ensure that the members conduct meetings as a group and do not get involved in private side discussions.
- Allow time for LNOs and staff representatives to provide information to, and receive guidance from, their commander or staff principal. Provide them with temporary SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) access and email addresses.
- LNOs and representatives must bring information back to the OPT from commanders and staff principals in a timely manner.
- Identify note taker(s) whenever briefing the commander. Designate two note takers as cross check for accuracy. Tape recorders are helpful as well. (Follow all classification and security measures.)
- Keep track of where the OPT “is” relative to the MCPP’s six steps.
- The OPT and Red Cell relationship should be complementary, not adversarial. The Red Cell acts as the “enemy OPT.” It develops enemy COAs during COA development and plays the enemy during the COA war game). See MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1, *Red Cell*, for more information on the Red Cell.
- Ensure that the G-2 has developed appropriate intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products (templates, matrices, enemy COAs, etc.), initial enemy center of gravity (COG) analysis, and high-value targets.

- Avoid focusing too much on the computers and other trappings of briefing preparation. Do not let these affect the quality and coherence of the information presented. Butcher block sheets are suitable for initial planning/brainstorming recording.
- With PowerPoint, using “builds” to cycle through the COA narrative and supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver) while keeping the COA sketch up on the screen is an effective technique.
- Brief the plan, don’t plan the brief. Allow time to rehearse and adjust the brief to ensure all issues are covered. Build the rough brief before convening the OPT.
- Designate a specific briefer for the commander (designated by the facilitator). This allows simultaneous preparation but seamless presentation.
- When the commander has seen something and indicates he understands and approves of it, do not change it without an overwhelming reason. If something must be changed, ensure he is not surprised—pre-brief him or the chief of staff.
- If time permits, show the chief of staff and the battle staff the draft brief before briefing the commander.
- Designate the members that have “speaking roles” during the brief. Others speak only when specifically addressed by the commander.
- Ensure the way information is presented is suitable for and amenable to the commander.
- Avoid going too far down in detail. Present the “wave top” issues, while having all details in reserve. Show the commander the issues which will impact the mission and which he should consider personally engaging higher and adjacent commands on.
- Think at the level of the commander. Know the issues he is concerned with.

2002. References

The following references may be helpful to the OPT in performing their assigned functions:

Joint Pub 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

Joint Pub 1-02	Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
Joint Pub 3-02	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
Joint Pub 3-02.1	Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations
Joint Pub 3-09	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support
Joint Pub 3-09.3	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support
Joint Pub 3-52	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone
Joint Pub 3-56.1	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
Joint Pub 5-0	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
Joint Pub 5-00.2	Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures
CJCSM 3122.03	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II
MCDP 1	Warfighting
MCDP 1-1	Strategy
MCDP 1-2	Campaigning
MCDP 1-3	Tactics
MCDP 2	Intelligence
MCDP 3	Expeditionary Operations
MCDP 4	Logistics
MCDP 5	Planning
MCDP 6	Command and Control
MCDP 1-0	Marine Corps Operations
MCWP 0-1.1	Componency
MCWP 2-1	Intelligence Operations
MCWP 3-1	Ground Combat Operations
MCWP 3-16	Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element
MCWP 3-16.1	Marine Artillery Operations
MCWP 3-17.1	River Crossing Operations
MCWP 3-2	Aviation Operations
MCWP 3-23	Offensive Air Support
MCWP 3-23.1	Close Air Support
MCWP 3-23.2	Deep Air Support
MCWP 3-24	Assault Support
MCWP 3-25	Control of Aircraft and Missiles

MCWP 3-25.2	Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Air-Ground System
MCWP 3-31.5	Ship-to-Shore Movement
MCWP 3-41.1	Rear Area Operations
MCWP 3-42.1	Fire Support in MAGTF Operations
MCWP 4-1	Logistics Operations
MCWP 4-11	Tactical Level Logistics
MCWP 4-12	Operational Level Logistics
MCWP 4-11.3	Transportation Operations
MCWP 4-11.4	Maintenance Operations
MCWP 4-11.7	MAGTF Supply Operations
MCWP 5-1	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCWP 5-11.1	MAGTF Aviation Planning
MCWP 6-2	MAGTF Command and Control
MCRP 3-16A	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process
MCRP 5-11.1A	Aviation Planning Documents
MCRP 5-12A	Operational Terms and Graphics
MCRP 5-12C	Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
FM 3-0	Operations
FM 3-40	Tactics
FM 100-13	Battlefield Coordination Detachment
FM 100-15	Corps Operations
FM 101-5	Staff Organization and Operations
MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1	Red Cell
MSTP Pamphlet 3-0.1	Marine Corps Force Protection
MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.3	MAGTF Planner's Reference Manual

Unit SOPs applicable to the units doing the planning

Also see Appendix E for a planning quick reference table.

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Part III

Operational Design

Commanders initiate the conduct of operations with a design that will guide their subordinate commanders and the staff in planning, execution, and assessment. This operational design is the commander's tool for translating the operational requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate commanders and his staff. The commander uses his operational design to *visualize*, *describe*, and *direct* those actions necessary to achieve his desired end state and accomplish his assigned mission. It includes the purpose of the operation, what the commander wants to accomplish, and how he envisions achieving a decision. Visualization of the battlespace and the intended actions of both the enemy and the friendly force is a continuous process that requires the commander to understand the current situation, broadly define his desired future situation, and determine the necessary actions to bring about the desired end state. The commander then articulates this visualization to his subordinate commanders and staff through his commander's battlespace area evaluation (CBAE) and guidance. By describing his visualization in this concise and compelling method, the commander focuses the planning and execution of his subordinate commanders and staffs. Finally, the commander directs the conduct of operations by issuing orders, assigning missions and priorities, making decisions, and adjusting his planned actions as necessary based on assessment.

Operational design differs at various levels of command, principally in the scope and scale of operations. Higher level commanders, such as the component and MAGTF commander, identify the time, space, resources available, and purpose of operations that support the joint force commander's campaign plan or component commander's operational design. At a lower level of command, the commander may be able to include in his operational design a detailed description of the battlespace, objectives, available forces and desired task organization, and guidance on the phasing of the operation.

Operational design helps the commander to visualize the operation and describe that vision to his subordinate commanders and the staff. See Figure 3-1.




Figure 3-1. Operational design

The elements of operational design include—

- Factors of METT-T.
- CBAE consisting of the commander's analysis of the battlespace, commander's intent, COG analysis, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Commander's guidance
- Decisive actions.
- Shaping actions.
- Sustainment.
- Principles of war and tactical fundamentals.
- Battlefield framework.
- Operation plan or order.

3001. Visualize

The *visualize* portion of operational design is what MCDP 5, *Planning*, refers to as conceptual planning, the highest level of planning. In conceptual planning, the commander determines the aims and objectives of the operation. During visualization, the first task for the commander is to understand the situation. He studies the situation to develop a clear picture of what is happening, how it got that way, and how it might further develop. The commander considers the information available on the factors of METT-T and any other information on the situation or potential taskings from higher headquarters. He develops an initial view of friendly actions, desired effects and their results, and determines the means to achieve those results.

Part of the commander's thinking should also include assuming the role of the enemy, considering what the enemy's best course of action may be, and deciding how to defeat it. Thinking through these factors helps the commander develop increased situational awareness. The commander must also address possible outcomes and the new situations that will result from those possibilities. As the situation changes, so will the solution and the actions that derive from it. Combining this initial understanding of the situation within the battlespace with his experience and military judgment, he may begin his visualization by posing the following questions—

- Where am I? Where is the enemy?
- Where are my friends? Where are the enemy's friends?
- What are my strengths? What are the enemy's strengths?
- What must I protect? What are the enemy's weaknesses?
- What must I do and why? What will the enemy do and why?
- What is the enemy's most dangerous COA?

As the commander considers these questions, he visualizes what he thinks he has to accomplish to achieve a decision and best support his higher commander's operation. This becomes the basis for his CBAE and guidance which he provides to his subordinate commanders and the planners in the describe portion of operational design.


3002. Describe

The *describe* portion of operational design is a combination of conceptual planning and what MCDP 5 refers to as functional planning, the middle level of planning in which the commander and the staff consider discrete functional activities that form the basis for all subsequent planning. It begins when the commander articulates his vision through his CBAE and initial guidance. The commander then uses this visualization to focus and guide the staff as they conduct mission analysis to determine the mission of the force.

Mission analysis provides the commander and his staff with additional insight on the situation. Combined with any intelligence or operational updates, mission analysis may prompt the commander to refine his vision, confirming or modifying his commander's intent or other initial guidance on decisive and shaping actions and sustainment. See Figure 3-2 (page 21).

Once the mission statement has been produced, the commander and staff are ready to further develop the operational design by describing how the command will achieve a decision through decisive and shaping actions. They also describe how these actions will be sustained. Receiving necessary commander's planning guidance, the staff begins to develop the *battlefield framework*. See Figure 3-3 (page 22).

This framework describes how the commander will organize his battlespace and his forces to achieve a decision. The battlefield framework consists of the battlespace organization of envisioned deep, close, and rear tactical operations as well as the organization of the force into the main effort, reserve, and security. Supporting efforts are addressed in the context of deep, close, and rear operations as part of the single battle.




This is just an illustrative example of how the process works. It lacks the detailed information the commander needs on his forces, the enemy, and the terrain to design and execute an actual operation.

“The purpose of this operation is to defeat the enemy’s first tactical echelon. I see the enemy’s tactical strength as his mobile reserves. I cannot let the enemy commit these reserves in a decisive manner. To support the higher commander’s plan, I will have to keep the reserve mechanized brigade from committing against our higher commander’s main effort or being used decisively against my forces. I want to shape the enemy by having him first commit his reserve armor battalion against my secondary effort. Simultaneously, by using lethal and non-lethal fires, I want to control the timeline for the commitment of the enemy’s reserve mechanized brigade and, once committed against my forces, I want to limit its capability. These shaping actions will allow me to fix the enemy reserves while I mass my combat power at the time and place of my choosing. I want to exploit my tactical center of gravity, my superior tactical mobility, and combined arms. I want to avoid the enemy’s fixed defenses and focus my decisive action against the enemy’s flank to defeat the two isolated mechanized battalions. Once defeated, I want to rapidly focus on the defeat of his remaining mechanized and reserve units that were fixed by my supporting effort. I want a viable security force covering the flank of my main effort. My sustainment must be task organized and positioned forward to allow the force to maintain operational momentum.”

Figure 3-2. Commander’s vision of decisive and shaping actions and sustainment.

This is just an illustrative example of how the process works. It lacks the detailed information the commander needs on his forces, the enemy, and the terrain to design and execute an actual operation.



On order the division attacks in zone to defeat the first echelon. **Close Operations**—In the west a mechanized regiment conducts a supporting attack to fix the forward mechanized battalion and cause the commitment of the enemy reserve armor battalion. To support this attack our deception effort will focus on portraying this supporting attack as our main effort. Upon the commitment of the enemy reserve, our *main effort*, consisting of a mechanized regimental task force, conducts a flank attack through the gap between the two defending mechanized infantry battalions and defeats the enemy armor battalion. Fires will disrupt any movement of the two mechanized enemy battalions and the enemy divisions command and control. The *reserve* is a mechanized regiment that follows the main effort and is prepared to defeat a flank counterattack from either enemy mechanized infantry battalion. If not committed against the two mechanized battalions, it will be prepared to block the enemy reserve mechanized brigade. **Deep Operations**—The MAG limits the reserve mechanized infantry brigade from reinforcing the first echelon. **Rear Operations**—A mobile CSSD is prepared to follow the main effort and conduct refuel on the move to maintain operational momentum. **Security**—A LAR battalion screens the main effort's eastern flank.

Figure 3-3. Battlefield framework.

3003. Direct

The *direct* portion of operational design is a combination of functional planning and what MCDP 5 refers to as detailed planning, the lowest level of planning. During direction the commander and the staff determine the specifics of implementing the operational design through the operation plan or order. Armed with the description of how the commander intends to achieve a decision and obtain his desired end state, planners conduct integrated planning using the battlefield framework and the six warfighting functions to develop and war game COAs that address the following considerations and issues—

- Type of operation.
- Forms of maneuver.
- Phasing/sequencing of the operation.
- Security operations.
- Sustaining the operation.
- Information operations.
- Targeting priorities.
- Intelligence collection priorities.

As this integrated planning continues, the commander chooses a COA and, if time and situation allow, the staff conducts detailed planning to provide further direction to the force and prepare necessary operations plans and orders. Once the plan or order is completed, the direct portion of operational design concludes with the transition of the plan or order to the subordinate commander's and the staff that will execute it. The operational design, once developed into an operation plan or order, is the basis for execution and aids the commander and the staff as they execute operations.

The commander assesses the success of the operation by comparing the envisioned operational design—as expressed in the operation order—with what is actually occurring in the battlespace. If the assessment indicates the need to modify or adjust the operational design the commander will again visualize what must be done and then he and the staff will describe how it will be accomplished by modifying or adjusting the battlefield framework. Fragmentary orders, branch plans, or sequels to direct the operation will be prepared and issued, if necessary.

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Part IV

Marine Corps Planning Process

Planning is an essential and significant part of command and control. MCDP 5 states that “planning constitutes half of command and control.” The MCPP is a decisionmaking process that supports the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. It recognizes the commander’s central role as the decisionmaker and focuses on the enemy and mission accomplishment. The MCPP helps organize the thought processes of a commander and his staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of effort and helps establish and maintain tempo.

The MCPP establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing and wargaming COAs against the threat, comparing friendly COAs against the commander’s evaluation criteria and each other, selecting a COA, and preparing an operation order (OPORD) for execution. It organizes planning into six manageable and logical steps. See figure 4-1.




Figure 4-1. Marine Corps planning process steps.

The MCPP applies to command and staff actions at all echelons. From the Marine Corps component to the battalion/squadron level, commanders and staff members must master the MCPP so they can make timely and relevant decisions. The MCPP provides the commander and his staff a means to organize and integrate their planning activities with higher, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate commands.

The MCPP is an internal planning process used by Marine Corps operating forces that complements deliberate or crisis action planning outlined in the JOPES as well as the planning processes of the other Services.

The MCPP can be used for time constrained planning by abbreviating the planning steps. As the planning time decreases, the personal involvement of the commander and the principle staff officers must increase. See Figure 4-2. It is the commander who decides how to shorten the planning process.



Figure 4-2. Time constrained planning considerations.

Successful time constrained planning depends on the unit's experience in planning and its ability to make significant preparations in organizing, training, and equipping. Unit SOPs must be highly refined and well rehearsed, commanders and planners must be intimately familiar with potential contingencies or missions, and every individual concerned with planning the operation must know their role in the planning process.

MCWP 5-1 identifies three tenets of the MCPP. These tenets are derived from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. They guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and execute military operations. Top-down planning and the single-battle concept ensure unity of effort, while the commander uses warfighting functions as the building blocks of integrated planning.

4001. Top-Down Planning

Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. Commanders—due to their military experience and judgment—must not merely participate in planning but must drive the process. The commander's intent and guidance are central to planning. He uses planning to gain knowledge and situational awareness to support his decisionmaking process. His plan, communicated in oral, graphic, or written format, translates his guidance into a plan of action for his subordinate commanders.

4002. Single-Battle Concept

The single battle concept allows the commander to effectively focus the efforts of all the elements of the force to accomplish his mission. A commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity, for operations or events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects on other areas and events. While the battlespace may be conceptually divided into deep, close, and rear operations to assist planning and decentralized execution, the commander's intent ensures unity of effort by fighting a single battle.

4003. Integrated Planning

Integrated planning provides the commander and his staff a disciplined approach to planning that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough. It is based on the warfighting functions—command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, force protection. Integrated planning helps planners consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information across the MAGTF. The key to integrated planning is the synchronization of the warfighting functions to achieve unity of effort.

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Part V

Mission Analysis

Mission analysis is the first step in planning. The purpose of mission analysis is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information provided by higher headquarters and produce a mission statement. This step drives the remainder of the MCPP.

The commander begins the planning process by issuing his commander's orientation. The commander's orientation describes his operational design. It includes the CBAE and initial guidance. He draws on his experience to visualize the relationship between friendly forces, enemy forces, and the battlespace. He envisions the interaction of these elements over time and how he will achieve a decision that leads to the desired end state. He communicates this vision through the most important element of CBAE—commander's intent.

Commander's intent focuses on the enduring portion of any mission—the purpose (the “why”)—which continues to guide subordinate's actions in execution while the tasks (the “how” or “what”) may change as the situation develops. As the commander proceeds through planning and his situational awareness grows, he may refine his intent by describing how he intends to achieve a decision (method) and reach the desired end state. One technique to express his intent is in *purpose–method–end state* format.

While the commander's intent is meant for both the planners and executors, the commander's initial guidance is aimed at the planners. This initial guidance provides the battle staff and OPT with additional insight of what his force is to do and the resources he will need to accomplish the mission. The initial guidance may be based on the six warfighting functions or how the commander envisions the sequence of actions that will cause his force to arrive at the desired end state. This guidance may also provide preliminary decisions to focus planners on the commander's conceptual vision of the operation. Ideally, the commander personally issues his guidance to subordinate commanders, principle staff and the OPT.

The OPT concentrates on the following questions during mission analysis—

- What have we been told to do? (Specified tasks.)
- What do *we* think we need to do to succeed? (Implied tasks.)
- What do we need?
- What don't we have?
- What information do we need to share and with whom do we share it?
- What does the enemy look like? What is he capable of?

The OPT leads the planning effort by ensuring that the members understand the purpose of the operation and those tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. The OPT normally assists the G-2 in the COG analysis, reviews and refines IPB products, and identifies asset and subject matter expert shortfalls. The battle staff then uses these products to begin developing the initial staff estimates and to request resource and subject matter expert augmentation. The OPT evaluates existing plans for relevance or for use in developing new operation plans or orders. It should also ensure that germane warning, planning, and implementing directives have been thoroughly reviewed. See figure 5-1.




Figure 5-1. Operational planning team in mission analysis.

The OPT is particularly useful in identifying information requirements. It can recommend to the commander that appropriate information requirements related to the enemy, environment, and friendly forces become CCIRs.

5001. Inputs

Mission analysis begins with the following inputs—

- Commander's orientation, including—
 - CBAE. This includes commander's battlespace, COG, commander's intent, and CCIRs.
 - Commander's initial guidance.
- Higher headquarters' warning order or OPORD/operation plan (if provided or available).
- Restraints/constraints (if provided or available).
- Higher headquarters' intelligence products (including high-value targets) and IPB products (if provided or available).

5002. Process

During mission analysis the OPT performs the following—

- Briefs the current enemy and friendly situation. Start the mission analysis briefing on the map. Orient the commander to the map by presenting the friendly situation.
- Prepares, refines, and briefs intelligence and IPB products (e.g., modified combined obstacle overlay, doctrinal and situational templates, high-value target list.) ***Continue developing and refining IPB tools. Ensure intelligence representatives work with fires and maneuver representatives in developing high-value (and ultimately high-payoff) targets.***
- Identifies the higher headquarters' commander's intent.
- Identifies the purpose of the operation. Brief the higher headquarters' concept of operations to all members of the OPT so that they understand how their operation supports the higher headquarters' mission. Ensure that the members understand the command relationships internal to the joint force as well as the MAGTF.
- Identifies the tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. This includes specified, implied, and essential tasks. Implied tasks should be linked to specified tasks—they are not routine or SOP-related tasks. Essential tasks apply to the force as a whole and form the basis

of the mission statement. All approved tasks are contained in the OPOD. *There should be a linkage between specified, implied, essential tasks and their relation to the mission statement and the purpose of the operation. Derive implied tasks by thinking about how the unit would accomplish its specified tasks, analyzing them across the warfighting functions. This helps to reduce omissions.*

- Analyzes the COGs provided by the G-2 and from the commander's orientation.
- Works closely with the Red Cell throughout the MCPP, particularly in determining the enemy's COG and critical vulnerabilities during mission analysis. The relationship between the OPT and the Red Cell is complementary, not adversarial. *Avoid rejecting Red Cell positions when they conflict with the OPT's views. They are articulating the G-2 officer's estimate of the situation to aid planning.*
- Refines the area of interest and area of influence. The area of interest today may be the area of operations (AO) tomorrow. If the area of influence is less than the AO, the commander may have to submit a request for additional forces or for a reduction in the size of the AO so that he can execute proper command and control. *Understanding why an area is of interest to the commander allows the OPT to gather the necessary information for the commander.*
- Reviews available assets and identifies resource shortfalls. Identifies requirements and may specify sources of filling the requirements. Often the command has little say on how a requirement will be satisfied.
- Identifies subject matter expert shortfalls.
- Determines additional restraints and constraints.
- Proposes CCIRs to the commander. CCIRs must be linked to an important decision the commander has to make.
- Identifies requests for information (RFIs). RFIs are submitted to higher headquarters in the commander's name. RFIs are questions the command cannot answer or information that it does not have. RFIs are not a substitute for proper staff action and coordination.
- Determines assumptions. Assumptions overcome planning "brick walls." To continue planning the OPT makes an assumption. Unvalidated assumptions become part of the inherent risk of the operation. Do not wish away an enemy capability.
- Drafts the mission statement. For example—

On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations in zone and defeats enemy forces in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to continue offensive operations into Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

- Presents a mission analysis brief. Put OPORD page numbers from where the task was derived on the briefing slide.
- Drafts a warning order once the commander approves the results of mission analysis and issues the mission statement. Have a warning order prepared for the commander's approval and release. A warning order follows the basic "SMEAC" format—situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal. A warning order can include any information that the commander deems essential for subordinates to begin planning and preparation for the upcoming operation. This can include commander's intent, concept of operations, commander's planning guidance, CCIRs, deception operations and targets, and command relationships. It may also contain orders for preliminary actions (reconnaissance and surveillance, staging logistics), coordinating instructions (time lines, planning meetings), and special equipment requirements (transfer of equipment).
- Develops recommendations for the commander's planning guidance. For example—

The purpose of this operation is to restore the Blueland border.

The enemy's dependence on his armor forces is both his source of strength and his Achilles heel. He relies on it for offensive shock, but the terrain places a tremendous strain on his underdeveloped logistics and command and control capabilities. I want you to consider this during COA development.

We are the joint force commander's main effort, but we must be prepared to support the Army if the JFC shifts the main effort to them. To be ready for this possibility I want to establish close liaison with the Army.

I see this as a multiphase operation—possibly three phases.

First I want to shape the battlespace by attacking the enemy's command and control, artillery, logistics facilities, and armor to fix the enemy first echelon forces. I want to avoid the enemy's fixed defenses and focus our COG as my decisive action against the enemy's second tactical echelon. Sustainment must be organized to support mechanized operations. Ensure we maintain security to protect the western flank.

At the same time we must linkup with the Blueland forces at Tealton. Ensure we isolate the battlespace from southern reinforcements.

Once we have defeated the enemy in Blueland and restored the border we must concentrate on rearming, refitting, and resupplying our forces for possible offensive operations in Orangeland.

5003. Outputs

The required outputs from mission analysis are the *mission statement*, *commander's intent*, and *commander's planning guidance*. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products (enemy COAs, modified combined obstacle overlay, doctrinal and situational templates, and high-value targets).
- Specified tasks.
- Implied tasks.
- Essential tasks.
- Warning order.
- Restraints/constraints.
- Assumptions.
- Resource shortfalls.
- Subject matter experts shortfalls.
- COG analysis (friendly and enemy).
- Approved CCIRs.
- Requests for information.
- Initial staff estimates.

5004. Common Mistakes

a. Commander's Intent

Symptoms

- Too wordy or lacks focus. Less may be better.
- Tends to focus on the “how” or “what” vice the “why” (purpose).
- Often written by staff officers and approved by the chief of staff.
- Looks more like planning guidance than intent.
- Lacks focus on the operation as a whole, concentrating on selected elements of the MAGTF.
- Terminology is inconsistent or confusing; key terms often require further definition.
- Reads like a concept of operations.

Solutions

- Must be the commander's personal expression of the overall purpose (why) of the operation.
- Use accepted doctrinal terms to express key points.
- Commanders must make a clear distinction between their intent and planning guidance.
- Less may be better.

b. Operational Planning Team and Staff Interaction

Symptoms

- No principal staff involvement in the OPT, either full or part time.
- Principal staff officers "less qualified/experienced" than their action officers on the MCPP and warfighting skills in general.
- Principal staff tendency to delegate and disappear.
- Principal staff officers often lack awareness/understanding of their role relative to their representative in the OPT.
- IPB is not complete (e.g., high-value target list is missing).

Solutions

- When the commander meets with the OPT, the principal staff officers should be present.
- The chief of staff must ensure that the battle staff is involved.
- Conduct training for the principal staff and OPT members.
- Maintain constant communication between the principal staff and the OPT representatives.
- Develop SOPs to assign OPT and staff responsibilities.

c. Commander's Critical Information Requirements

Symptoms

- CCIRs are not linked to decisions; not supported by the collection plan; not tracked.
- Too many CCIRs diffuse focus; many information requirements are not required for commanders to make decisions.

- Not posted to promote awareness, recognition, and reporting.
- Often generated and approved by staff members vice the commander.
- Rarely updated to reflect changes in the battlespace and tactical situation.
- Higher headquarter's CCIRs not tracked or reported on by the staff.

Solutions

- CCIRs should be of such importance that they are required to support the commander's decisionmaking process.
- All CCIRs must be approved by the commander.
- CCIRs must be disseminated widely to all units and staffs.
- CCIRs must be updated to reflect the commander's current concerns and the changing tactical situation.

Part VI

Course of Action Development

A COA is a broadly stated potential solution to an assigned mission. The COA development step of the MCPP is designed to generate options for follow-on wargaming and comparison that satisfy the mission, intent, and guidance of the commander.

The OPT concentrates on the following questions during COA development—

- What do we want to do?
- How do we want to do it?

During COA development, the OPT uses the battlefield framework (see figure 3-3) to translate the commander's intent and planning guidance into initial COAs. After a review of these products by the commander, the OPT conducts COA refinement, reviews the COA based on the commander's COA criteria, and then prepares the COA development brief. See figure 6-1.




Figure 6-1. Operational planning team in course of action development.

COA development is the most challenging step in the planning process. The OPT must use its collective experience and judgment to creatively develop different ways to accomplish the mission and achieve the desired end state.

The OPT must first focus on the enemy. Then it reviews the friendly situation—how to array the friendly forces based on current and projected locations. With this done the OPT looks at relative combat power and assesses the relative strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of friendly forces to enemy forces. The goal is to use friendly strengths (COGs) to exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities in developing COAs. The following tables are examples of relative combat power assessment.

Ground Combat Power MEF versus NOG							
	Tanks	Artillery	MLRS/ MRL	Armored Infantry Vehicle	Tank Bns	Infantry Bns	Total Bns
MEF	334	114	90	455	6	12	18
NOG	525	403	84	623	12	12	24

Table 6-1. Example of tangible relative combat power assessment.

Factor	Rating	Remarks
Leadership	Good	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Premiere operational command in the Orangeland army. ● Senior officers well educated and formally trained in the operational art. ● Most experienced junior officers and NCOs are assigned to the NOG.
Morale	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Defeated Blueland 313th Brigade. ● Excellent cohesion and esprit. ● Well equipped. ● Troops have demonstrated discipline in low intensity engagements.
Training	Marginal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● NOG usually fights as independent brigades. Not experienced in conducting and controlling multi-brigade combined arms operations. ● Orangeland pilots do not fly sufficient hours to maintain proficiency.

Table 6-2. Example of intangible relative combat power assessment.

6001. Inputs

COA development requires a *mission statement*, *commander's intent*, and *commander's planning guidance*. Other inputs include—


- Updated IPB products (enemy COAs, modified combined obstacle overlay, doctrinal, situational, and event templates, and high-value targets).
- Specified tasks.
- Implied tasks.
- Essential tasks.
- Warning order.
- Restraints/constraints.
- Assumptions.
- Resource shortfalls.
- Subject matter expert shortfalls.
- COG analysis (friendly and enemy).
- Approved CCIRs.
- RFIs.
- Initial staff estimates.

6002. Process

During COA development the OPT performs the following—

- Reviews enemy force laydown (event template). Ensure time phase lines are depicted. Understanding the enemy’s potential movement helps to synchronize friendly actions.
- Displays friendly forces.
- Assesses relative combat power. Ensure the combat power assessment is justifiable.
- Refines the COG analysis.
- Develops initial COAs using the commander’s planning guidance and his vision of shaping and decisive actions. When formulating COAs, the OPT addresses decisive, shaping, and sustainment actions by using a construct of deep, close, rear, main effort, supporting effort, reserve, and security. The OPT must ensure that all elements of the MAGTF are assigned appropriate missions, battlespace, command relationships, and resources. The OPT will also use—
- IPB products, enemy COAs, and friendly force laydown. These factors determine what is possible and if actions can be conducted simultaneously, sequentially, or in phases.

- The relative combat power assessment.
 - Friendly and enemy COGs, critical vulnerabilities, high-value targets, and high-payoff targets. *Use friendly COGs to attack or exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities—not their COGs.*
 - Mission.
 - Tactical tasks. *Ensure that each tactical task has a purpose to support the COA.*
 - Forms of maneuver (envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, flanking attack, frontal attack). See MCDP 1-0 and FM 3-40.
 - Type of attack or operation (offensive—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, pursuit; defensive—mobile, position).
 - Designation of main and supporting effort. *Identify the main effort by stage to help develop tasks for supporting units.*
 - Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. *Identify the effects of shaping on specific enemy units.*
 - Scheme of maneuver (deep, close, and rear operations).
 - Boundaries.
 - Fire support coordination measures. *In coalition operations, it is essential to use doctrinally accepted and clearly understood fire support control measures to facilitate coalition cross boundary fires and minimize fratricide.*
 - Task organization.
 - Reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
 - Use of reserves. *Identify location and conditions for committing the reserves.*
 - Rules of engagement.
- Use realistic movement rates. Ensure that they are based on actual capabilities and the effects of weather and terrain. See MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.3, *MAGTF Planner's Reference Manual*.
 - Review the mission analysis and commander's guidance—this may allow the OPT to recommend new CCIRs.
 - Develops COA graphic and narrative. See figure 6-2. Depict unit symbols and other graphics correctly—errors are distracting. Use pressure sensitive clear labels printed by computer for traditional acetate overlays and butcher block sketches. Look through the COA narratives to see if all subordinate units have been tasked.



On order MEF conducts an envelopment to defeat enemy first operational echelon forces north of Gray City. **Close Operations:** In the east a division conducts a supporting attack in zone to fix the first tactical echelon. In the west a division, as the **MAIN EFFORT**, attacks along **AXIS SWORD** and defeats the second tactical echelon. **Reserve:** A regiment follows the main effort prepared to contain enemy forces capable of threatening the main efforts movement south. If not committed north of PL Teal, the reserve is prepared to block enemy reinforcements from the south. **Deep Operations:** MAW initially disrupts the 402nd Artillery Regiment's ability to mass fires on the main effort and limits the 103rd, 104th Armored Brigades, and the 204th Mechanized Brigade from reinforcing the first tactical echelon. When the main effort crosses PL Teal the MAW disrupts enemy second operational echelon forces from committing to the MEF zone. **Rear Operations:** A battalion task force acts as the MEF's TCF with the priority of responding to a Level III Threat to the MEF's class III fuel depot vicinity Greentown to ensure the uninterrupted flow of Class III. The FSSG establishes CSSA in vicinity of Tealton and Grey City to provide combat service support to MEF units. **Security:** The MAW screens to the west to protect the MEF's western flank. This phase concludes with enemy first operational echelon forces defeated north of Gray City.

Figure 6-2. Course of action graphic and narrative.

The COA graphic and narrative must clearly describe how the unit will accomplish the mission and explain the scheme of maneuver. It should describe how the COA achieves the commander's vision of decisive actions, shaping actions, and sustainment through the battlefield framework of deep, close, and rear. It should include the subordinate unit tasks and purpose with the end state; and describe the task organization, type of operation, form of maneuver, array of forces, how supporting effort relates to the main effort (to include a reserve if designated), priority of fires, and control measures. The COA graphic and narrative includes—

- The purpose of the operation.
- Enemy known or templated locations.
- Identification of critical friendly events and phases of the operation (if phased).
- Designation of the main effort, along with its task and purpose.
- Designation of supporting efforts, along with their tasks and purposes, linked to how they support the main effort.
- Designation of reserve (if required), to include location, composition, task, and purpose.
- Ground and air axes of advance.
- All unit boundaries that establish the AO.
- Deep, close, and rear operations.
- Reconnaissance and security operations.
- End states of the phases and stages.
- Identification of maneuver branches that may develop during an operation.
- Location of engagement areas or attack objectives and counterattack objectives.
- Concept of fires.
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Command and control attack priorities.
- Prescribed formations or dispositions when necessary.
- Priorities for each combat support and combat service support element in support of the operation.
- Integration of obstacle effects with maneuver and fires.

In addition, the COA graphic and narrative should include the array of generic forces, and control measures such as—

- The forward edge of the battle area or the line of departure/contact and subsequent phase lines.
 - Reconnaissance and security graphics.
 - Assembly areas, battle positions, strong points, engagement areas, and objectives.
 - Aircraft operating sites.
 - Sustainment sites.
 - Obstacle control measures and tactical mission graphics.
 - Location of command posts.
- Ensures conformance with commander’s COA criteria. Ensure COAs meet the COA criteria (see Table 6-3)—both generic (MCWP 5-1) and specific (commander’s planning guidance).

Suitability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accomplishes the mission. • Complies with commander’s guidance.
Feasibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time, space, and resource constraints.
Acceptability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates advantage with reasonable cost in resources.
Distinguishability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forms of maneuver. • Main effort. • Sequential versus simultaneous.
Completeness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accomplishes all tasks. • Accomplishes the purpose.

Table 6-3. Course of action criteria.

- Prepare appropriate supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver) for each COA to ensure actions are integrated and synchronized. Once the commander selects a COA for the concept of operations, the supporting concepts developed in this step are the basis for the concepts of intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver, etc., in the OPORD. See the following pages for examples of supporting concepts.

COA 1

Concept of Fires: MEF fires will degrade the enemy's ability to conduct a cohesive defense by attacking maneuver, fire support, and C2 elements. Fires will be executed by stage in phase.

(a) Phase I

1 Purpose: Prepare to disrupt enemy attempts to attack Tealton and neutralize enemy fire support assets supporting any attack.

2 Method: MAW prepares to disrupt 201st and 202^d Mechanized Brigade, 102^d Armor Brigade. On order MAW neutralizes the 401st Artillery Regiment and 103^d Armor Brigade.

3 End State: 401st Artillery Regiment incapable of massing fires above battalion-level in support of the enemy attack on Tealton; 103^d Armor Brigade unable to deploy forces above battalion strength north of PL Black for a coordinated attack on Tealton; Tealton secure, enemy attempts at spoiling attack unsuccessful.

(b) Phase II Stage A

1 Purpose: Disrupt and neutralize Orangeland forces to allow MarDiv to attack first echelon forces and 1st Armored Division to envelop second echelon forces. Interdict enemy forces movement to landing beaches.

2 Method: MAW interdicts the 205th Mechanized Brigade from H to H+10; neutralizes the 401st Artillery Regiment from H+8 to H+40; and disrupts Orangeland HQ C2 from H+6 to H+15, 102^d Armored Brigade from H+8 to H+40, and 104th, 103^d Armored Brigades from H+8 to H+40.

3 End State: 205th Mechanized Brigade defeated by 1st Armored Division; 1st Armored Division at PL White; 401st Artillery Regiment neutralized; the 101st, 102^d, 104th, and 105th Armored Brigades, 201st, 301st, and 302^d Mechanized Brigades attacked and disrupted. FSCL#1 (PL White) shifts to FSCL#2 (PL Black)

(c) Phase II Stage B

1 Purpose: Disrupt and neutralize Orangeland forces to allow 1st Armored Division to destroy Orangeland HQ and defeat the 101st, 104th Armored Brigades and 201st Mechanized Brigade.

2 Method: MAW disrupts Orangeland HQ C2 from H+18 to H+96. Neutralize 402nd Artillery Regiment from H+48 to H+96. Destroy known SA-2, SA-5 positions.

3 End State: 1st Armored Division destroys Orangeland HQ, defeats enemy forces in zone and establishes a defense along the Blueland border. MarDiv clears first echelon forces in zone. MAW prepares to establish air point vicinity of Emerald Isle.

(d) Phase II Stage C

1 Purpose: Prepared to disrupt enemy counterattack attempts across the Blueland border and support the defense.

2 Method: MAW be prepared to disrupt 105th and 106th Armored Brigades and 206th and 302^d Mechanized Brigades.

3 End State: MAW establishes an air point on Emerald Isle and MEF forces prepared for continued offensive operations.

COA 1

Concept of Intelligence: MEF intelligence operations will emphasize developing the current situation to support the advantageous application of our maneuver and fires capabilities.

(a) Phase I

1 Purpose: Provide early notification of enemy attempts to attack Tealton, and accurate location of associated fire support assets.

2 Method: MEF aerial imagery and SIGINT collections assets conduct surveillance of the 201st and 202nd Mechanized Brigades, and the 102nd and 103rd Armored Brigades. MEF ground reconnaissance assets will conduct active counter-reconnaissance against enemy forward-deployed fire observation assets and ground reconnaissance assets to identify their location, destroy them where able, and further define the enemy's security area. MEF HUMINT assets will deploy to Tealton to support RSO&I operations.

3 End State: Early notification of enemy attempts to attack Tealton. 401st Artillery Regiment located.

(b) Phase II Stage A

1 Purpose: Identify enemy preparations for movement towards landing beaches.

2 Method: MEF aerial imagery assets will focus surveillance operations against the 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Armored Brigades, and 401st Artillery regiment from H+8 to H+40. Additionally, a thorough visual reconnaissance will be conducted from the 1st Armored Division line of departure, through Bealton and conclude in Gray City NLT H+40. MEF SIGINT collections assets will focus surveillance operations against Orangeland HQ C2 to support answering the MEF PIRs.

3 End State: 401st Artillery Regiment attempts to reposition identified. Orangeland attempts to reinforce landing beaches identified.

(c) Phase II Stage B

1 Purpose: Support the 1st Armored Division attack by identifying location and activities of Orangeland HQ, 101st and 104th Armor Brigades, and 201st Mechanized Brigade.

2 Method: MEF SIGINT collections assets will continue surveillance operations against Orangeland HQ C2 to support answering the MEF PIRs. MEF aerial imagery assets will focus surveillance operations against the 402nd Artillery Regiment and known SA-2, SA-5 positions.

3 End State: Orangeland HQ, 101st and 104th Armor Brigades, and 201st Mechanized Brigade identified.

(d) Phase II Stage C

1 Purpose: Identify Orangeland preparations for counterattack across Blue land border.

2 Method: MEF aerial imagery and SIGINT collections assets will focus surveillance operations against the 105th and 106th Armored Brigades, and the 206th and 302nd Mechanized Brigades. MEF HUMINT assets will continue collections in support of force protection requirements vicinity of MEF rear area, sustainment nodes, and aviation assets.

3 End State: Identify assembly areas for Orangeland counterattack forces.

COA 1

Concept of Logistics

(a) Phase I

1 Purpose: Provide logistics support of MARFOR RSO&I.

2 Method: Buildup of 30 days of supplies by C+95 in Greentown with a goal of 60 days of supplies by C+105. COSCOM is directed to provide CSS to all ARFOR forces attached OPCON to MARFOR. Coordinate with NAVFOR for additional log support as needed. MARFOR will coordinate host nation support as required. After offloading of equipment and sustainment from the MPSRONS,

3 End State: All CSSE attached to maneuver units formed in assembly area ready to cross the LOD.

(b) Phase II Stage A

1 Purpose: Provide general support and direct support logistics support to all MEF and attached units in the MEF AO.

2 Method: Provide direct support logistics support to MEF with MCSSDs originating out of Greentown. Provide logistics support to 1st AD with COSCOM out of Blueland. Establish forward FSSG headquarters element in Tealton in order to plan for echeloning of CSS forces to Tealton. Coordinate with NAVFOR in order to support all amphibious operations within the MEF AO.

3 End State: CSSA established at Tealton.

(c) Phase II Stage B

1 Purpose: Provide logistics support to MEF forces by establishing an FCSSA in the vicinity of Tealton.

2 Method: Buildup CSS sustainment in Tealton in order to establish an FCSSA. MCSSDs will continue to operate out of Greentown until the FCSSA has been established at Tealton. COSCOM will continue to provide direct support CSS to the 1st AD throughout operation. MEF will maximize the movement of CSS forward by utilizing the air and sea lines of communications. After establishing an FCSSA in vicinity of Tealton, MEF will send a forward FSSG headquarters element to Gray City after it has been secured in order to echelon CSS elements to that location. Identify host nation support POL assets and locations. Coordinate with NAVFOR for port support at Tealton and Gray City.

3 End State: 30 days of supplies built-up in Tealton.

(d) Phase II Stage C

1 Purpose: Establish CSSA in vicinity of Gray City in order to provide CSS support to MEF units.

2 Method: Echelon sustainment forward to Gray City utilizing line-haul and sea lines of communication. Utilize MCSSDs in vicinity of Gray City and Tealton in order to support maneuver units in the MEF AO.

3 End State: Operational pause conducted at the Blueland border in order to conduct repair, refuel and rearming operations prior to commencement of phase III as needed.

- Prepares the COA development brief. Conduct a rehearsal to reduce omissions. Have the enemy depicted on the map during the brief.

6003. Outputs

COA development produces outputs that drive subsequent steps of the MCPP. Required outputs of COA development are the *commander's designated COAs for wargaming, wargaming guidance, and evaluation criteria*. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools including the COA graphic and narrative.
- COA briefing.
- Initial estimates of supportability and additional requirements from subordinate commanders.
- Initial staff estimates and additional requirements from staff and warfighting function representatives.

6004. Common Mistakes

a. Planning Guidance

Symptoms

- Lacks focus on key items critical to staff planning—decisive actions, shaping actions, and sustainment.
- Fails to connect COG and critical vulnerabilities to decisive actions and main effort.

Solutions

- Express what the commander wants to accomplish.
- Lay out the commander's views of decisive actions.
- Express thoughts on shaping to support decisive actions.
- Level of detail should reflect the time available.

b. Course of Action Development

Symptoms

- IPB is not employed.

- No linkage or connection between friendly COG, enemy critical vulnerabilities, decisive and shaping actions, main and supporting efforts.
- Not assigning proper missions, command relationships, or battlespace.
- Not providing proper resources to major subordinate commands to accomplish the mission within the assigned battlespace.
- Designation of reserve and its concept for employment often unintentionally omitted.
- The ground combat element drives the MAGTF COA.
- Supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver) not developed or are not integrated and synchronized.
- Inadequate COA graphics or no COA narrative.
- Substituting fire support control measures for boundaries.
- Incomplete COAs.
- No deception plan incorporated with MAGTF assets that provide the plan to be believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable.

Solutions

- Use IPB as the cornerstone for planning.
- The commander uses his intent and planning guidance to focus the staff on the operation's purpose and how he will achieve a decision.
- COAs employ friendly strength versus enemy weakness.
- Supporting concepts, graphic and narrative provide detail appropriate for the echelon of command.
- Address all elements of COA development (deep, close, rear; main effort, supporting effort, reserve, security; decisive actions, shaping actions, and sustainment).

c. Battlespace

Symptoms

- MAGTF and major subordinate command's battlespace often assigned without regard to capabilities, mission, and the ability to conduct planning, decision, execution, and assessment.
- Lack of an appreciation of time and space as it relates to unit capabilities and limitations to accomplish tasks in the battlespace environment. Examples include:

- Multiple shifts of the main effort in a short span of time.
- Attempting to simultaneously accomplish complex tasks that require the same limited assets.
- Attempting a short-fused execution of MAGTF or major subordinate command's change of mission or task organization.

Solutions

- Base the initial evaluation of battlespace on the enemy, environment, and friendly capabilities and limitations without regard to boundaries or other artificially limiting factors. Look at what the command needs and compare to what the command was assigned.
- Thorough analysis of the time and battlespace required to accomplish tasks and activities is essential.
- Ensure terrain management facilitates sustainment requirements for each particular activity or operation.

d. Single Battle

Symptoms

- The major subordinate command's concepts of operations do not add up to the MAGTF mission.
- MAGTF often subdivides battlespace into close, deep, and rear and fails to focus the actions within them to achieve unity of effort.
- MAGTF delegates and disappears. The major subordinate commands are left to their own devices. The MAGTF monitors execution, but leaves all decisions to the major subordinate commands. (A fine line between decentralized execution and abrogating responsibility).
- No MAGTF level scheme of maneuver with multiple ground combat elements.
- Maneuver, fires, and intelligence are not mutually supporting or function in stovepipe fashion.
- No unifying intent that provides the underlying purpose behind the operation.
- Lack of guidance on decisive actions and shaping objectives dilutes the staff and major subordinate command's focus.

- Poor articulation of the plan (orders development/transition) does not promote common understanding among subordinates as to their role and how it fits in with all others.
- Lack of integrated planning between all the warfighting functions.

Solutions

- Commander's intent must clearly articulate the overall purpose (why) of the operation.
- Commander's guidance should address decisive actions, shaping actions, and sustainment to focus the staffs and major subordinate commands.
- Plans must be understandable, definable, achievable, and measurable. Make sure the plan is read by all to promote common understanding.
- Receive confirmation briefs from subordinate commanders to ensure understanding of intent and relevancy of subordinate operations.
- Conduct integrated planning across all six warfighting functions.

e. Decisive Actions, Shaping Actions, and Sustainment Symptoms

- No common understanding within the MAGTF of the anticipated decisive action for the operation.
- No linkage of decisive actions and shaping to the main and supporting efforts. This manifests itself in multiple shifts of the main effort without regard for achieving a decision.
- Shaping discussed without regard to decisive actions.
- Shaping plan not developed beyond the conceptual level to include objectives, tasks, and measures of effectiveness.
- Major subordinate commander's and staffs do not understand their role in either achieving or supporting decisive actions.
- Friendly COG seen as a resource to be protected, not as the principle source of strength to be applied decisively against the enemy.

Solutions

- The commander must identify the single action critical to his mission success.

- The commander must use his intent and planning guidance to clearly articulate his vision of decisive action.
- Focus the main effort on decisive actions.
- Use shaping to set the conditions for decisive actions.
- Shaping takes all lethal and non-lethal activities into account, not just fires.

f. Main and Supporting Efforts and the Use of the Reserve

Symptoms

- No linkage or connection between friendly COG, enemy critical vulnerabilities, decisive actions, and the main effort.
- Preplanned shifting of main effort with no description of anticipated conditions, or opportunity to be capitalized on for decisive effect.
- Supporting effort assigned as the main effort to offset its “vulnerability” (e.g., amphibious landing) vice its ability to be decisive.
- Designation of the reserve often unintentionally omitted.
- Reserve not capable of performing assigned missions.
- Reserve overtaxed with multiple missions, or already committed with on order missions.

Solutions

- Friendly COGs are a source of strength; use them asymmetrically to exploit enemy COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) vice just protecting them.
- Main effort should be decisive; decisive actions drive the designation of the main effort.
- Main effort normally should be our strength (COG) applied against enemy weaknesses (critical vulnerabilities).
- Commander’s vision of decisive and shaping actions should drive the designation of the main effort.
- Organize the reserve in anticipation of being employed to achieve the decisive action.
- Do not over task the reserve.

g. Terminology and Symbology

Symptoms

- Lack of understanding of military terms (e.g., defeat versus destroy) that leads to a major subordinate command being tasked beyond its capabilities.
- Use of both “be prepared to” and “on order” in the same task statement.
- Use of terms when assigning tasks/objectives that are not measurable or achievable.
- Use of “new wave” terms (i.e., “unhinge,” “disassemble,” “take down”) that require further definition leading to mission creep (in either direction).
- Action officers who easily tire of a word/term when writing the operation order and feel compelled to use a different word/term thus changing the meaning or scope of the task.
- Failure of the commander to confirm that his words are understood.
- Imprecise use of military symbology and graphics.

Solutions

- Use accepted military terms per doctrinal publications.
- When assigning tasks, use terms that are definable, achievable, and assessable.
- Conduct an orders cross-walk to ensure understanding and prevent mission creep (increasing or lessening the requirement).

h. Assessment

Symptoms

- Failure to plan for assessment. Tasks, objectives, and end states lack definition and achievable conditions.
- Tasks and end states that often are not achievable or measurable, thus they cannot be assessed as to progress.

Solutions

- Craft tasks and end states in such a manner to facilitate their measurement toward progress and attainment.

- Focus tasks and conditions on producing the desired effect on enemy capabilities instead of levels of attrition (neutralize/destroy to 50%).
- Identify measures of effectiveness and required conditions for success for critical tasks or events. Ensure that these are incorporated into the OPORD.

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Part VII

Course of Action War Game

The COA war game allows the commander, his staff, and the OPT to gain a common understanding of friendly and threat COAs. The war game helps determine the advantages and disadvantages of each COA and allows warfighting functions to be synchronized across the battlespace (close, deep, and rear).

The OPT concentrates on the following questions during the COA war game—

- Does the COA achieve the purpose of the operation?
- Is the COA supportable?
- What if...?

The OPT independently evaluates each friendly COA against selected enemy COAs—most likely, most advantageous, most dangerous. They use the commander’s evaluation criteria to determine how best to attack enemy critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities. The Red Cell plays the enemy during the war game. See figure 7-1.




Figure 7-1. Operational planning team in course of action war game.

7001. Inputs

COA wargaming requires *the commander's designated COAs for wargaming, wargaming guidance, and evaluation criteria*. Other inputs include—

- Updated IPB products (enemy COAs, event templates and matrices, named areas of interest, targeted areas of interest, and high-value targets).
- Planning support tools including the COA graphic and narrative and synchronization matrix.
- Estimates of supportability and additional requirements from major subordinate commanders.
- Staff estimates and additional requirements from staff and warfighting representatives, including an updated intelligence estimate with an event template and threat COAs.
- Updated facts and assumptions.

7002. Process

During the COA war game the OPT performs the following—

- Participates in the COA war game. They ensure that each COA is evaluated independently against the commander's evaluation criteria and against the enemy's expected action. *The following are techniques for the OPT to use during the war game—*
 - *Stick to approved COAs, both enemy and friendly. The OPT leader will get the commander's approval for any changes to a COA during wargaming.*
 - *Brief the event template. As the war game progresses refine it into a decision support template.*
 - *Each COA should have a decision support template and matrix created from the situation template, event template, COA graphics overlay, and modified combined obstacle overlay used for the war game.*
 - *Ensure all participants know the rules, planning factors, rates of movement, consumption and resupply rates, and weapons ranges and effects.*

- *All the available tools are just that—tools. Some will work, some won't. Use what is available to the best advantage.*
- *Identify the war game technique and mechanics early enough to allow both the Red Cell and the OPT to prepare.*
- *Use a terrain map (if available) to do the war game.*
- *Make sure intelligence actions support fires.*
- *G-2 representative should brief collection plan to track high-payoff targets. Once detected, track until it is attacked and the desired results are achieved.*
- *Synchronize the movement of counterfire radars and cueing schedule to ensure continuous coverage.*
- *Red Cell should brief their situation and plan to set the stage for the war game.*
- *Have a Red Cell member present all the time, but make a distinction between the Red Cell and the G-2 OPT representative. The former provides insight into enemy capabilities and actions per the COAs presented to them by the G-2. The latter is the conduit to intelligence resources, products, and refined assessments.*
- *Record results during the war game, not after. Assign recorders from the outset. Describing the COA in terms of the commander's wargaming guidance as part of the brief is effective in demonstrating adherence to the guidance. The recorder should enter information from the war game on a synchronization matrix and COA war game worksheet.*
- *Adhere to the war game turn sequence to save time. See Appendix G for an example of a war game sequence worksheet. The facilitator should make the call to depart from the turn sequence to discuss issues.*
- *Avoid being ground combat element-centric, fight the whole unit. Put equal emphasis on aviation and logistics assets available during combat power analysis, COA development, and wargaming.*
- *Use the aviation combat element as a maneuver element that can provide fires. Consider that aviation is always essential, but rarely sufficient, for decisive action and mission success.*
- *Do not rely on deception to succeed. Use it to enhance a feasible COA.*
- *Validate conditions for tactical tasks.*

- *Validate conditions and end states for transitioning to next phase or stage.*
 - *Look across the entire battlespace—deep, close, and rear. Consider the warfighting functions within each.*
 - *Refine location and timing of decisive action.*
 - *Identify critical events and locations. Some critical events and locations may be identified before beginning the war game.*
 - *Identify and validate high-payoff targets. Prioritize by stage or phase.*
 - *Template indirect fire units, organization for combat, positions, ranges, and command and control to prioritize for collection and targeting.*
 - *Refine and validate fire support coordination measures and boundaries. Identify the control and coordination requirements, and establish conditions for changing fire support coordination measures and boundaries.*
 - *Refine command and control requirements.*
 - *Refine CCIRs. Ensure they are linked to decisions.*
 - *Refine and validate the intelligence collection plan. This should include all intelligence collection activities such as the insertion and extraction of reconnaissance teams, activation of named areas of interest, etc.*
 - *Identify friendly high-value assets and ensure that they have adequate protection.*
 - *If receiving support from adjacent units, have the details—battlespace, coordination, requirements, capabilities, etc.*
 - *Casualty estimates should be done during the turns. This is the G-1's job and is a tedious but critical aspect of developing information to support COA comparison and decision.*
 - *Know when to apply military judgment and continue. Do not get bogged down in ratios and percentages.*
 - *If time allows use the following method. Begin with avenue-in-depth technique to identify critical events along each axis. Then use the belt technique to show critical events across the separate axes. Finally use the box technique to further war game each critical event.*
- *Wargaming helps refine staff estimates and estimates of supportability. Ensure the estimates are in enough detail.*

- Prepares the COA war game brief. Sequence the narrative in the same manner as the turn (blue-red-blue). Additional information can include movement rates, relative combat power of forces, and a post-engagement logistics situation display (casualties, ammunition remaining, fuel remaining, etc.). The “task, purpose, method, effect” format allows clearer articulation of fire support tasks during the briefing. (See Appendix D.)

7003. Outputs

Required outputs of the COA war game are the *war gamed COA graphic and narrative* and *information on the commander’s evaluation criteria*. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools including the COA war game worksheet and synchronization matrix.
- War game results such as initial task organization, identification of assets required and shortfalls, refined CCIRs, and the list of critical events and decision points.
- Refined staff estimates.
- Subordinate commander’s estimates of supportability.
- Branches and sequels identified for further planning.

7004. Common Mistakes

Symptoms

- Major subordinate command and staff representatives unprepared to conduct the war game.
- OPT does not identify critical events before the war game.
- OPT gets too bogged down in ratios.
- OPT unprepared to do the war game; improvises rather than having relevant planning factors.
- The warfighting functions are not synchronized across deep, close and rear areas.

- OPT conducts COA development instead of COA war gaming.
- Decision support template and matrix not completed.

Solutions

- Ensure complete COAs are developed before the war game.
- Identify critical events and locations before the war game.
- Focus on the commander's evaluation criteria. Do not let ratios overshadow what the commander needs to know.
- Ensure participants keep to a simple, concise format (task, purpose, and coordinating instructions) when explaining their wargaming actions.
- Ensure participants have the appropriate information (organization and combat power for their units, logistics capability and throughput locations, available reconnaissance and surveillance assets, sortie rates, etc.).

Part VIII

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

In COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs—against established criteria, then against each other—and selects the COA which best accomplishes the mission. The commander may refine his mission statement (including his commander’s intent and essential tasks), concept of operations, and identify any branches of the chosen COA that should be developed. This step requires the involvement of the commander, his subordinate commander’s, and their staffs from start to finish.

The OPT helps the commander answer the following questions during COA comparison and decision:

- How do the COAs stack up against one another?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- What are the risks?

The OPT helps the commander identify and select the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The OPT supports the commander’s decisionmaking process by clearly portraying his options and recording the results of the process. The OPT ensures the selected COA is faithfully captured as the concept of operations. The concept of operations—along with the supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver)—forms the basis for the operation plan or order. The OPT may also prepare a warning order for subordinate commands to facilitate the rapid development of plans based on the approved COA. See figure 8-1.




Figure 8-1. Operational planning team in course of action comparison and decision.

8001. Inputs

COA comparison and decision requires the *war gamed COA graphics and narratives* and *information on the commander's evaluation criteria*. Other inputs might include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools including the COA war game worksheet and synchronization matrix.
- War game results such as initial task organization, identification of assets required and shortfalls, refined CCIRs, and the list of critical events and decision points.
- Refined staff estimates
- Subordinate commander's estimates of supportability.
- Branches and sequels identified for further planning.

8002. Process

During COA comparison and decision the OPT helps the commander, or the chief of staff, perform the following—

- Assist the commander in evaluating and comparing the COAs. He may use a COA comparison and decision matrix with comments or simple ranking. *Graphically portray the commander's options and record his decisions. Ensure the battle staff provides a detailed explanation of the staff estimates based on the commander's evaluation criteria.*
- Prepare the concept of operations. See the example below.

Concept of Operations. MEF conducts OPERATION LIGHT SABER in four phases.

(1) Phase I: Deterrence/Prepare for Combat Operations. On order, Task Force Wolf conducts amphibious operations to reinforce the 31st Blueland Mechanized Brigade in Tealton, supports MARFOR in conducting RSO&I operations to prepare for the MEF's arrival. MAW prepares to disrupt 201st and 202^d Mechanized Brigade, 102^d Armor Brigade. On order MAW neutralizes the 401st Artillery Regiment and 103^d Armor Brigade.

End State: MEF command and control established, units in assembly areas and prepared for Phase II operations. 401st Artillery Regiment incapable of massing fires above battalion-level is support of the enemy attack on Tealton; 103rd Armor Brigade unable to deploy forces above battalion strength north of PL Black for a coordinated attack on Tealton; Tealton secure, enemy attempts at spoiling attack unsuccessful.

(2) Phase II: Combat Operations. MEF fixes Orangeland first echelon and envelops the Orangeland second echelon in order to destroy Orangeland military forces from Blueland and restore the Blueland border. MEF conducts Phase II in three stages.

(a) Stage A: Begins D-day at H-Hr (260200Z July 2001)

1 1st Armored Division (ME) attacks on axis GREEN and secures Bealton to set the conditions to envelop the Orangeland HQs and second echelon forces.

2 MarDiv (SE) attacks in zone and fixes the Orangeland first echelon in order to protect the main effort's left flank.

3 MAW (SE) disrupts Orangeland C2, 102nd and 104th Armored Brigades, and 401st Artillery Regiment in order to prevent massing on ME.

4 FSSG (SE) establishes a combat service support area to support following stages.

End State: Bealton secured, Orangeland first echelon forces fixed, Orangeland C2 disrupted (102nd, 104th, and 401st), and intermediate CSSA established to support subsequent stages.

(b) Stage B: Begins when 1st Armored Division crosses PL White.

1 1st Armored Division (ME) attacks on axis GREEN, defeats 101st and 104th Armored Brigades, destroys Orangeland HQ, and defeats remaining second echelon forces in order to restore the Blueland border.

2 MarDiv (SE) attacks in zone, fixes the Orangeland first echelon to protect the ME, and secures port facilities at Gray City for throughput in later stages.

3 MAW (SE) neutralizes 402nd Artillery Regiment, disrupts 101st Armored Brigade and Orangeland C2.

4 FSSG conducts direct support logistics operations from intermediate CSSA at SFAX, prepares to put Gray City into operation.

End State: 101st and 104th Armored Brigades defeated, Orangeland HQ destroyed, second echelon forces defeated, and border restored. CSSA established in the vicinity of Gray City to rearm, refuel, and resupply the MEF.

(c) Stage C: Begins when 1st Armored Division occupies defensive positions on the Blueland border.

1 1st Armored Division (ME) defends in sector, clear in zone, rearms, refits and prepares for Phase III.

2 MarDiv (SE) clears in zone, rearms, refits, and prepares for Phase III.

3 MAW establishes air point at Emerald Isle, disrupts Orangeland CATK forces.

4 FSSG (SE) establishes a combat service support area in the vicinity of Gray City to provide combat service support to the MEF.

End State: MEF AO cleared in zone, units ready for Phase III combat operations.

(3) Phase III: Exploitation. To be issued.

(4) Phase IV: Post-Hostilities and Redeployment. To be issued.

Ensure that all the warfighting functions have been synchronized to accomplish the assigned mission. Finalize the commander's intent and CCIRs.

- Prepare the warning order.

8003. Outputs

The required output of COA comparison and decision is the *concept of operations*. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products (modified combined obstacle overlay, situation template, event template and matrix, decision support template and matrix, high-value targets, and high-payoff targets).
- Planning support tools.
- Updated CCIRs.
- Staff estimates.
- Commander's identification of branches for further planning.
- Warning order. As planning continues, it becomes the basis of the operation order.

8004. Common Mistakes

Symptoms

- Staffs do not prepare adequate estimates.

- Principle staff officers are not pre-briefed by their OPT representatives.
- Major subordinate commanders are not pre-briefed by their OPT representatives.
- Principle staff officers do not participate in the comparison process.

Solutions

- Prepare staff estimates early in the planning process, before beginning the war game.

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Part IX

Orders Development

Orders development communicates the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form that is easily understood by those who must execute the order. The order should only contain critical or new information—not routine matters normally found in SOPs. The chief of staff or the executive officer, as appropriate, directs orders development.

The OPT concentrates on the following questions during orders development—

- How can we ensure that the plan is understood?
- How can we best direct and focus their tasks and activities?

Staff estimates are converted into the appropriate annex or appendix to the operation plan or order. The OPT ensures the refined commander's intent is incorporated in the operation plan or order. See figure 9-1.




Figure 9-1. Operational planning team in orders development.

9001. Inputs

The *initial task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, concept of operations, and specified and implied tasks* are required input for orders development. Other inputs may include—

- Updated intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Updated CCIRs.
- Staff estimates.
- Commander's identification of branches for further planning.
- Warning order.
- Existing plans, orders, and SOPs.
- Chief of staff or executive officer orders development guidance.

9002. Process

During orders development the OPT performs the following—

- Assists their respective staff sections in preparing the plan or order. They ensure that staff estimates are converted into the appropriate annex and appendix to the operation plan or order. Each principle staff officer should review their respective annexes. Use JOPES, MCWP 5-1, or theater order standards to prepare the plan or order. Usually an operations order will contain at a minimum the following—
 - Basic plan or order.
 - Annex A, Task Organization,
 - Annex B, Intelligence.
 - Annex C, Operations.
 - Annex D, Logistics.
 - Annex J, Command Relationships.
 - Annex K, Combat Information Systems.
 - Annex U, Information Management.
 - Annex X, Execution Checklist. *The synchronization matrix and decision support matrix—developed during the COA war game—are the basis for Annex X.*

Ensure that the specified, implied, and essential tasks are only in paragraph 3c or 3d. Do not place tactical or critical tasks in annexes and appendices. Ensure measurable conditions and end states are assigned to tasks and transitions between phases. Maintain version control. Do not have numerous draft versions of the order circulating.

Identify the supporting concepts of intelligence, fires, logistics, and maneuver in the basic order. They should not be buried in the annexes or appendices.

Consider developing and using an operations SOP instead of standard “boiler plate” annexes, appendices and tabs to the operations order. Ensure copies are available (paper and electronic) for dissemination to attachments and adjacent units as required.

- Conducts orders reconciliation. Orders reconciliation is an internal process in which the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire order. Begin with the basic order and make sure that the mission, intent, concept of operations, and coordinating instructions are complete and in agreement. The tasks assigned to the subordinate commands must follow the commander’s intent and the concept of operations (along with the supporting concepts of intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver). Reconcile the annexes and appendices with the basic order to ensure that there are no conflicts or omissions.
 - Focus on the tactical tasks from the basic order and whether the annexes (particularly annex A, B, C, D, J, and X) and appendices are logically linked to those tasks in terms of intent and synchronization.
 - It may be helpful to use the decision support template, decision support matrix, and synchronization matrix to ensure the order accurately captures what was planned.
 - Check the coordinating instructions to see that they provide complete and appropriate information.
 - Ensure that the restricted fire areas in Annex C match the reconnaissance team locations in Annex B.

- Conducts the orders crosswalk. The staff compares the order with the orders of higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure that the superior commander's intent is met. It is vital that the appropriate representatives are present from the subordinate commands. Begin with the basic orders and ensure that the mission statements, commander's intents, concepts of operations, tasks, and coordinating instructions are in agreement.
- Focus on the major tasks assigned by the unit. Ensure that the subordinate units have addressed their assigned tasks in their concept of operations.
- Pay attention to the timing of the subordinate unit's activities in relation to the issuing command's activities.
- Check the major annexes and appendices to make sure they are coordinated as well.
- Compare the subordinate unit's concept of operations sketches to the issuing command's sketch to see that the boundaries, fire support control measures, and maneuver control measures agree.

Do not complete the reconciliation and the crosswalk in one session. Ensure that once the subordinate commands have completed their plan, the OPT conducts an orders crosswalk on it against their own plan. This is the last opportunity to ensure the proper use of terminology and synchronization.

9003. Outputs

The output of orders development is an approved *plan* or *order*. Other outputs may include—

- Updated intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Outline fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) for branches.

9004. Common Mistakes

Symptoms

- Orders and component parts being developed in stovepipe fashion.
- Sections of orders or changes to orders posted on various web pages or sites to be pulled vice issued or pushed.
- Different versions of orders and appendixes posted on web pages.
- Briefings and briefing slides being used as authoritative documents, and often in conflict with the operation order.
- Orders crosswalk and reconciliation not done.
- Doctrinally correct operational overlays not produced.

Solutions

- Centralize the distribution of orders to insure that information is current (version control) and has been properly disseminated.
- Use SOPs to reduce the amount of information required in the operation order.
- The operation order and supporting FRAGOs must be the single source of authority. Use of briefings and supporting slides causes problems in dissemination of information: “If it’s not in the order it’s not part of the plan.”

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Part X

Transition

Transition ensures a successful shift from planning to execution. It enhances the situational awareness of those who will execute the plan, maintains the intent of the concept of operations, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo.

The OPT concentrates on the following questions during transition—

- How can we best communicate the commander’s intent and the plan?
- How can we best build the situational awareness of those who must now execute the plan?
- How can we ensure that all the plans within the command are synchronized?

Transition is a continuous process that requires a free flow of information between commanders and staffs by all available means. See figure 10-1.




Figure 10-1. Operational planning team in transition.

In reality there are two types of transitions: an internal and an external. An internal transition is when the staff moves its plan to execution within the command. An external transition is one where the command, normally the current operations section, presents the order to subordinate commanders. (For the subordinate commands this provides the final input for their planning process which culminates with the confirmation brief to the higher commander.)

Although a formal transition occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams, a similar process takes place at all levels of command. At the higher echelons, the commander may designate a representative as a proponent for the plan or order. Normally this is the G-3 current operations representative of the OPT. As a full participant in the development of the plan, this proponent can answer questions, help in the use of the decision support tools, and assist the staff in determining adjustments to the plan or order. At lower levels of command, where planning time and personnel may be limited, the transition takes place intuitively as the planners are also the executors.

Transitions can take the form of briefs, drills, exercises, or rehearsals. Understanding increases with more time to conduct the transition. As the completeness of the transition increases, additional preparation time and resources are required. See figure 10-2.




Figure 10-2. Transition versus time.

10001. Inputs

Transition requires the approved *plan* or *order*. Other inputs may include—

- Refined intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Outline FRAGOs for branches.
- Information on possible sequels.
- Any outstanding issues.

10002. Process

During transition the OPT performs the following—

- Conducts the internal transition drill. Brief all tools (decision support template and matrix, synchronization matrix, execution checklist), enemy situation, concept of operations, and supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver) in detail. Current operations should rehearse using this information.
- Assists the commander in the execution drill. Ensure that subordinate commanders do a confirmation brief of their plan to the higher commander so he can identify discrepancies between his and subordinate commander's plans.
- Provides a transition proponent to current operations (usually the G-3 current operations representative).

10003. Outputs

The outputs of a successful transition are subordinate commanders and staffs that are—

- Ready to execute the order and possible branches.
- Prepared to plan sequels in priority.

10004. Common Mistakes

Symptoms

- Internal and external transitions are not done or are incomplete.
- Confirmation briefs not conducted by subordinate commands.

Solutions

- Ensure transition brief is given to the major subordinate commanders.
- Ensure commanders give a confirmation brief to their superior commander.

Part XI

Planning Branches and Sequels

The work of the OPT does not stop after the order has been transitioned. The OPT may now begin to develop branch plans and sequels to provide flexibility to the plan for the commander. A branch is a built-in option for changing the mission, organization, or direction of movement of the force to ensure or exploit success because of anticipated events or opportunities. A sequel is a major operation that will follow the current operation. They are based on the possible outcomes of the current operation.

Each branch plan and sequel requires the OPT to review the mission analysis information, then conduct COA development through transition. At the same time the OPT monitors the current operation to determine the impact on the branches and sequels. The OPT also reviews the targeting priorities, and updates the branches and sequels as necessary to support the targeting board and current operations. See figure 11-1.




Figure 11-1. Operational planning team in planning branches and sequels.

Planning branches requires the commander's input. To focus the efforts of the OPT, the commander identifies and prioritizes the branches he wants the OPT to further develop.

Frequently branch and sequel planning occurs during execution. To maintain good situational awareness, the OPT must continue to receive information on the operation from their current operations section representative. Battle update briefs and "board walks" are a good opportunity for the OPT to retain its situational awareness.

Because it normally occurs during execution, branch and sequel planning will likely be time constrained. The OPT may need to compress each step of the planning process while requiring greater involvement of the commander and the principal staff.

Appendix A

Battle Staff's Role

Staffs exist to help the commander make and implement decisions. The commander's staff must function as a single, cohesive unit. The staff is responsible for conducting the detailed planning for the commander: the OPT is not solely responsible for planning. Each staff member must know his own duties and responsibilities in detail and be familiar with the duties and responsibilities of other staff members. This appendix discusses the role of the battle staff during planning.

A-1. Mission Analysis

During mission analysis the battle staff helps the commander determine the mission and understand the threat, terrain, weather, and current and projected friendly capabilities. They provide the necessary information for the commander to review the higher headquarters' warning order or OPOD, intelligence estimate, and IPB products (modified combined obstacle overlay, doctrinal template). They begin staff estimates to address problems, and provide critical facts and assumptions to orient the commander. They support the commander's development of planning guidance and check the mission for accuracy and clarity. The battle staff guides the OPT by providing them critical facts, assumptions and guidance. The OPT briefs the battle staff prior to their briefing the commander. Possible guidance and information for the OPT includes—

- **Chief of Staff/Executive Officer.** The chief of staff/executive officer provides the staff's battle rhythm. He also provides the internal planning timeline, and when—and in what format—the plan or order will be issued to subordinates. He must ensure the information management plan is being used and supports staff interaction.

- **G/S-1 Officer.** The G/S-1 officer provides the projected personnel strengths, critical military occupational specialty (MOS) shortages, assumptions on replacements, and morale level.
- **G/S-2 Officer.** The G/S-2 officer provides the enemy's purpose, objectives, COGs and critical vulnerabilities, and the enemy commander's profile. He identifies, evaluates, and prioritizes possible enemy COAs (with templates and matrices). He also provides terrain and weather analysis. The G/S-2 officer develops IPB products and high-value targets. He informs the OPT of projected intelligence collection assets and capabilities (higher and organic). He is also responsible for supervising the Red Cell.
- **G/S-3 Officer.** The G/S-3 officer helps identify tasks, friendly COGs, and critical vulnerabilities. He determines if the AO is the correct size to accomplish the mission and protect the force. The G/S-3 officer ensures that the assumptions are logical and the end state is clear. He determines the risk the commander is willing to accept. He also identifies the command relationships and the impact of the air tasking order (ATO) cycle on the command's battle rhythm.
- **G/S-4 Officer.** The G/S-4 officer provides the projected logistics requirements. He identifies the capability of distribution system, critical shortfalls, and the maintenance status for critical end items. He also provides the movement plan, noting mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability requirements and capabilities.
- **G-5 Officer.** The G-5 officer coordinates with the Marine Corps component for required airlift and sealift. He ensures that the time-phased force and deployment data is validated. He provides information on the next potential mission and the plans of the adjacent and supporting commands.
- **G/S-6 Officer.** The G/S-6 officer provides projected availability and capability of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) assets. He identifies the electronic warfare and information warfare threat.
- **Medical Officer.** The medical officer provides projected treatment and evacuation capabilities and the medical return to duty rate.
- **Staff Judge Advocate.** The SJA identifies the legal constraints and restraints. The also provide information on the rules of engagement, law of war, treaties, United Nations resolutions, etc.

A-2. Course of Action Development

During COA development the battle staff supports the commander by ensuring the OPT generates options that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, complete, and meets the commander's planning guidance. They continue to develop and update staff estimates, update critical facts and assumptions, and support commander's development of wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria. The battle staff continues their close interaction with the OPT. They ensure graphics and other information is clear and accurate. Possible guidance and information for the OPT includes—

- **Chief of Staff/Executive Officer.** The chief of staff/executive officer ensures that the OPT meets the planning timeline, that the information management plan is being used, and that the commander's operational design is being followed. He ensures that friendly high-value assets are identified to focus force protection efforts. He refines and manages the CCIRs as necessary.
- **G/S-1 Officer.** The G/S-1 officer ensures the personnel support concept is adequate. He also checks the updated projected strengths, critical MOS shortages, assumptions on replacements, priority of support, and enemy prisoner of war handling.
- **G/S-2 Officer.** The G/S-2 officer ensures that the collection plan is adequate for each COA. He provides updated or refined enemy COAs, COGs, critical vulnerabilities, modified combined obstacle overlays, and event templates and matrices. The G/S-2 officer provides the OPT and Red Cell the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs. He also updates the high-value targets.
- **G/S-3 Officer.** The G/S-3 officer ensures the decisive and shaping actions meets the commander's intent and guidance. He determines if the assigned AO is appropriate and recommends necessary refinement to the commander. He looks at the forms of maneuver, concepts of maneuver and fire, terrain management, relative combat power, rear area functions, and the use and location of the reserve. The G/S-3 officer evaluates the COA to determine if it exceeds the risk the commander is willing to accept to achieve a decision. He ensures that friendly high-value assets (critical vulnerabilities) are protected. He also looks at the command relationships and task

organization. He helps identify high-payoff targets and targeting objectives.

- **G/S-4 Officer.** The G/S-4 officer ensures that the concept of logistics supports the shaping and decisive actions. He checks the priority of support, locations of support areas and bases, main supply routes, and traffic control measures.
- **G-5 Officer.** The G-5 officer provides information on the next potential mission and the plans of the adjacent and supporting commands.
- **G/S-6 Officer.** The G/S-6 officer ensures that the C4I support concept is adequate. He also checks the locations of higher, adjacent, and subordinate command posts.
- **Medical Officer.** The medical officer provides the medical support concept and the location of medical facilities.
- **Staff Judge Advocate.** The SJA continues to identify the legal constraints and restraints.

A-3. Course of Action War Game

During COA wargaming the battle staff supports the commander by evaluating the effectiveness of COAs against both the threat's COAs and commander's evaluation criteria. They continue staff estimates and update critical facts and assumptions. They participate in the war game to ensure the COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. This helps ensure that planning factors are correct and that they understand critical events, decision points, and advantages and disadvantages for each COA. The battle staff continues to provide guidance to the OPT. Possible guidance and information for the OPT—

- **Chief of Staff/Executive Officer.** The chief of staff/executive officer ensures that the OPT continues to meet the planning timeline, that the information management plan is being used, and that the commander's intent and planning guidance are being followed.
- **G/S-1 Officer.** The G/S-1 officer continues to ensure that there are sufficient personnel to accomplish the mission and that the planning factors are accurate (combat and noncombat casualty projections, estimated personnel strengths, critical MOS shortages, and replacements, replacement policies, enemy prisoners of war projections, etc.).

- **G/S-2 Officer.** The G/S-2 officer ensures that the collection plan has adequate assets to cover all named areas of interest. He identifies high-payoff targets. He ensures that intelligence products are provided to subordinate units to assist their planning. He identifies any collection asset shortages. The G/S-2 officer ensures that the collection plan tracks enemy high-payoff targets. Once detected, he sees that it is tracked until desired results are achieved. He also supervises the Red Cell, especially during wargaming.
- **G/S-3 Officer.** The G/S-3 officer ensures that friendly strength is used against enemy critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities. He ensures that deep, close, and rear operations are synchronized across the warfighting functions. The G/S-3 officer ensures the accuracy of movement planning factors and combat actions. He also monitors the effects of shaping, operational reach, time to accomplish the mission, relative combat power, risk assessment, and rear area functions.
- **G/S-4 Officer.** The G/S-4 officer ensures that the supply planning factors are accurate and that the distribution system is adequate. He looks at potential shortfall in requirements or capabilities. He ensures that traffic control and the number of military police to execute the traffic management plan is adequate. The G/S-4 officer ensures that each COA has an acceptable enemy prisoner of war plan.
- **G-5 Officer.** The G-5 officer provides updates or changes on the next potential mission and the plans of the adjacent and supporting commands.
- **G/S-6 Officer.** The G/S-6 officer ensures that the C4I planning factors and equipment are sufficient to support the unit.
- **Medical Officer.** The medical officer ensures that there are adequate treatment and evacuation capabilities for each COA.
- **Staff Judge Advocate.** The SJA assesses the impact of legal constraints, restraints, and rules of engagement on the COAs. He requests modifications of constraints, restraints, or rules of engagement, or of the COA.

A-4. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision the battle staff helps the commander compare COAs and decide which COA the command will execute. They compare the COAs using the commander's evaluation criteria and their

recommendations from staff estimates. From the war game they understand the critical events and decision points. The battle staff ensures that approved branch plans are developed to support the plan.

A-5. Orders Development

During orders development the battle staff helps the commander issue a complete, concise, and clear plan or order that accomplishes the mission. The chief of staff/executive officer determines the format of the plan or order and which annexes will be published. The battle staff sets and enforces time limits and development sequence for the basic plan or order and annexes. They conduct an orders reconciliation and crosswalk by reviewing appropriate annexes, appendices, etc. to ensure they are complete and agree with the rest of the order and higher headquarters' order. Finally, once approved by the commander, they issue the order.

A-6. Transition

During transition the battle staff helps the commander by ensuring the staff and subordinate units understand the order. They ensure the staff sections understand the order, branch plans, sequels, and decision support tools. They assist subordinate staffs with their planning and coordination. They recommend priority and allocation of time for rehearsal events and participate in transition briefs and rehearsals (rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills and confirmation briefs).

Appendix B

Major Subordinate Command OPT Considerations

The major subordinate command OPTs enhance integrated planning by providing a representative to the MAGTF OPT. Integrated planning also requires the major subordinate commander's, their staffs, and OPTs to coordinate actions with each other. The actions discussed under the following paragraphs are those that the major subordinate command OPTs should contemplate while the MAGTF OPT is conducting that step.

Before the major subordinate command OPT begins mission analysis—and while the MAGTF OPT is conducting mission analysis—it should:

- Orient the commander so he can develop his operational design and prepare his CBAE and guidance.
- Use the command's LNO to the MAGTF OPT to gain situational awareness and insight on the MAGTF commander's proposed purpose of the operation.
- Begin to gather initial information.
- Ensure that the G/S-2 begins its IPB with a focus on the unit's requirements.

For the MAGTF OPT to develop detailed COAs, the major subordinate command's OPTs should :

- Produce an initial draft of the estimate of supportability based on the MAGTF's initial COAs.
- A rough concept of intelligence, fires, logistics, and maneuver should begin to become apparent as the estimates of supportability near completion. This rough concept should be forwarded to the command's LNO at the MAGTF OPT.

Before the MAGTF OPT conducts its war game, the major subordinate commands should complete their estimates of supportability.

To ensure that the major subordinate commands use the same enemy doctrine and capabilities, their Red Cell leaders should participate or observe the MAGTF Red Cell during planning and wargaming.

Although the MCPP applies to all Marine Corps units, there are unique considerations for each major subordinate command OPT. The following sections deal with specific planning considerations for each major subordinate command.

B-1. Ground Combat Element

a. Mission Analysis

- Provide input to the MAGTF to ensure that battlespace concerns, resource shortfalls, supportability of proposed MAGTF COAs are considered.
- Have the ground combat element LNO to the MAGTF brief the ground combat element OPT daily on all developments and issues.
- Anticipate subject matter expert requirements (e.g., translators, foreign area officers) for planning.
- The OPT facilitator and G-2 plans officer should collect basic, relevant information from higher headquarters and other sources for the commander to support development of his CBAE.
- The OPT facilitator will establish a battle rhythm to ensure members will have fixed periods of time daily that they may be able to communicate and develop information to support the OPT.
- Ensure OPT augmentees and LNOs are briefed on OPT procedures and the MCPP before the start of mission analysis.
- Ensure combat service support, aviation combat element, and rear area LNOs are present at the outset of planning. They should provide their command's ability to support ground combat element operations.

b. Course of Action Development

- When considering the various forms of maneuver in determining initial COAs, ensure the other element LNOs brief the concepts being developed by their OPTs. The aviation combat element LNO should also brief their battlespace shaping concept and related issues.

Recommend fires support coordination measures to the MAGTF OPT.

- Ground combat element control measures must be introduced with strong consideration of the MAGTF single battle. Close coordination in the development of control measures with MAGTF, aviation combat element and combat service support element OPTs will maximize the use of each command's capability without severally limiting their freedom of action.
- If tasked with providing the MAGTF reserve, recommend the use of the ground combat element reserve as the MAGTF's reserve. The use of the reserve by the ground combat element requires the MAGTF commander's approval.

c. Course of Action War Game

Have subordinate maneuver units provide a representative to maneuver their unit during the war game. This provides multi-dimensional value to the planning process.

d. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

The ground combat element OPT members should have representatives available when the commander makes his decision and record branches and sequels that the commander identifies for further planning.

e. Orders Development

Ensure the ground combat element order follows the MAGTF orders format.

f. Transition

- The ground combat element OPT should consider sending current operations maneuver and logistics representatives to the aviation combat and combat service support element's transition briefs or drills. They should invite the other element's representatives to the ground combat element transition brief or drill. This will ensure understanding of all the element's concepts in support of the MAGTF single battle.
- To provide a smooth transition, the OPT should include a member of the current operations staff (operations officer, assistant operations

officer, prospective senior watch officer, etc) as a member of the OPT.

- Conduct a confirmation brief to the MAGTF commander.
- If time permits, conduct a combined arms rehearsal to synchronize fires and maneuver.
- Rehearse procedures for fire mission processing, clearance of fires, and fire support coordination measures dissemination.

B-2. Aviation Combat Element

a. Mission Analysis

- IPB should be tailored to the aspects of aviation planning, to include airspace coordination, helicopter routes, enemy air defense, radar coverage, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), sea lanes (if considering amphibious operations using aviation assets or TAVSB support), and unmanned aerial vehicle routing. IPB should also focus on host nation capabilities for aviation, such as airfields (and include capabilities inherent with each airfield).
- In aviation operations, there are normally many implied tasks that will not be specifically tasked by the MAGTF. The use of FARPs, aerial refueling tracks, defensive anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. can all be implied tasks. It is important not to get too detailed with tasks that are normally accomplished in accordance with aviation unit SOPs. A good way to narrow down implied tasks is to focus on those tasks that support specified tasks.
- Often, the tactical tasks assigned by the MAGTF will determine the essential tasks for the aviation combat element. Common tactical tasks are to screen a flank, interdict an enemy unit, neutralize an enemy unit, or destroy an enemy unit or capability. The aviation combat element mission statement is made by determining the essential tasks identified by the aviation combat element OPT and tied together by the commander's purpose for the mission. When analyzing tasks, consider the effects of terrain, weather, and task duration. The following is an example of a generic mission statement:

At D + 40, MAW screens the MEF's western flank, interdicts the 18th Armor Corps, and disrupts 7th Artillery Group in order to support the MEF's rapid movement southward to the Blueland border.

b. Course of Action Development

This is the most difficult of the MCPP steps for ACE planners.

- When considering the possible COAs, it is best to look at the assigned tactical tasks. Often, the way to design COAs is to determine the support necessary through the positioning of intermediate support bases and FARPs. In addition, it is important to have aviation logistics representatives in the OPT to determine logistic requirements, and how to support intermediate support bases and FARPs. To ensure continuous operations the OPT must focus on command and control and logistics of all available assets (e.g., aerial refueling, amphibious ships for refueling and rearming, or rapid ground refueling). To have a continuous generation of sorties, it may be detrimental to displace aviation assets as ground combat elements are conducting operations move.
- When developing a COA, one technique is to determine the requirements based on aviation function rather than units. For example, determine the assault support requirements rather than “MAG-16” requirements; determine close air support requirements rather than individual Marine aircraft group (consider both fixed- and rotary-wing close air support) requirements.
- One of the more difficult aspects of COA development is to determine methods to make the COAs distinguishable. The following are considerations to make COAs different and distinguishable—
 - Look at essential/tactical tasks and consider different aircraft capabilities (i.e., screen with rotary- or fixed-wing assets).
 - How to employ airfields and FARPs (different units at different sites, movement rates, logistics required to support, movement control, etc.).
 - Different employment concepts to support an amphibious landing.
 - Deception using aviation assets.
 - When to surge sorties. A surge is planned and tied to the MAGTF commander's concept of operations. Reactive surges are less

effective. This requires extensive planning to determine the effort and resources (ordnance, fuel, maintenance, air crew) to accomplish the assigned tasks. Moreover, the aviation combat element commander's apportionment recommendation (and subsequent allocation and allotment decisions) must be tied to the estimate of supportability.

- Foul weather plan.
 - Night versus day operations.
 - Positioning/validation of existing fire support coordinating measures (i.e., kill boxes).
 - Task organization.
 - Different methods to attack enemy critical vulnerabilities.
 - Different methods for command and control. For amphibious operations, how will the commander exercise command and control? Will he use the joint command and control architecture or naval command and control capabilities? Will he phase ashore the Marine Air Command and Control System?
- **Relative Combat Assessment.** This process is challenging for aviation planners because they may not have the same enemy, environmental, or infrastructure concerns as the MAGTF or ground combat element. If there is a significant enemy air threat (enemy aircraft, air defense, etc.) they may compare their aviation combat power relative to the enemy aviation threat. Another method is to look at the tactical tasks and determine the enemy laydown to determine the sorties necessary to accomplish the task. For assault support, the assessment often requires detailed planning to see if there are enough rotary-wing assets to accomplish all the assault support tasks, especially if the weather does not allow fixed-wing operations.
 - **Synchronization Matrix.** Instead of dividing up the synchronization matrix by warfighting function, the aviation planners may divide the synchronization matrix by aviation function.

c. Course of Action War Game

To war game aviation combat element COAs, one technique is to use the "sequence of essential tasks" mentioned in Annex E of the MCWP 5-1 for each COA. The planners then look at each essential/tactical task as a critical event using a box technique rather than a belt or avenue of approach

method. Wargaming should include the weather and look at three scenarios—

- Unrestricted fixed-wing/unrestricted rotary-wing operations.
- Restricted fixed-wing/unrestricted rotary-wing operations.
- Restricted fixed-wing/restricted rotary-wing operations.

d. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

The aviation combat element OPT members should have representatives available when the commander makes his decision and record branches and sequels that the commander identifies for further planning.

e. Orders Development

Special consideration should be given to the MAGTF's Annex W (Aviation Operations). The tasks from the MAGTF's basic order, Annex W, and Annex C provide direction for the aviation combat element's required support to attain the MAGTF commander's single battle. The aviation combat element order is an internal document that focuses on the aviation combat element's subordinate commands and their support to the MAGTF. Aviation combat element orders development requires careful scrutiny of the MAGTF order to identify applicable portions of the MAGTF order that need to be included in the aviation combat element order. As a result, some portions of the MAGTF order should be directly inserted in the aviation combat element order, others require elaboration for aviation-specific operations, while others may be omitted completely. The aviation combat element operations order provides basic information, such as general sortie generation, airspace control measures and responsibilities, initial apportionment and allocation, and planning factors that will be continually refined and amplified by the daily airspace control order and MAGTF air tasking order.

f. Transition

Like the other elements, transition has to occur within the staffs of the aviation combat element. This includes the internal transition from the planners to the executors on the aviation combat element staff and the external transition from the aviation combat element staff to the group staffs. In addition, the aviation combat element commander conducts a confirmation brief to the MAGTF commander.

B-3. Combat Service Support Element

a. Mission Analysis

Although logistics may set the limits on operational capabilities, the combat services support element OPT's mission analysis should be conducted with an attempt to generate tempo, maximize operational reach, and increase the endurance of the force.

- Conduct a detailed mission analysis using the MAGTF commander's mission analysis products—principally his CBAE, refined intent, and approved mission statement.
- The combat service support element commander's guidance may include; requests or warnings about weather patterns or phenomenon that could impact logistics operations (typhoons, monsoons, tidal ranges); desired actions at ports and airfields; footprint required ashore (terrain management guidance); desired throughput rate; and expected/projected stockage levels (i.e., anticipated controlled supply rates versus required supply rates).
- The MAGTF commander will set the battlespace for all major subordinate commands and will determine the COG for the entire MAGTF. The combat service support commander will have to provide combat service support mission-unique CCIRs and his own commander's intent for his forces.
- The commander must begin considering logistics shaping (size, shape, location, concept of operations). The logistics effort must be integrated; it cannot just be allowed to happen over time. Will there be a need take specific operational actions to expand logistics capabilities in order to support the decisive action? What are the logistic characteristics of the AO and the area of interest? What is the logistics infrastructure of the battlespace (what exists in the battlefield that may be put to use)?
- Logistics intelligence (the combat service support IPB and associated intelligence information) is specific intelligence information that assists logistic organizations in mission accomplishment. It focuses on the infrastructure in the area of interest, which may extend back to the continental U.S. for the logistician. It is largely environmental information and is focused toward logistics requirements and is not enemy information exclusively. It answers the question "How would weather, enemy, and terrain affect logistics operations?"

- The combat service support element OPT will usually discover that there are few specified tasks in the higher operations order. Most of the combat service support tasks are implied and requires experience and judgment of the OPT to determine them.
- In addition to the normal elements of a mission statement, a combat service support mission statement has additional elements. These additional elements identify the supporting unit, define the specific support mission, and identify the supported unit. The following are examples of generic mission statements:

On order, the FSSG conducts general support and direct support combat services support operations in order to support the MEF's attack to the limit of advance. On order, the FSSG conducts LOTS operations in the vicinity of Greentown in order to support continued movement south to the limit of advance.

On order, the BSSG conducts general support health service support operations in support of designated nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations in order to prevent the spread of disease beyond the current containment zone.

On order, the MCSSD conducts direct support combat service support operations in support of RCT 1 in order to defeat the 104th Armored Brigade in zone. On order, continue direct support combat service support operations in support of RCT 1 south to the MARDIV limit of advance.

- At the completion of mission analysis, the combat service support element commander should issue a refined commander's intent along with his mission statement.

b. Course of Action Development

The combat service support element must produce a reasonably complete estimate of supportability to ensure the MAGTF COAs are supportable. They can then produce a COA for logistics support and ultimately contribute to the development of a MAGTF concept of logistics.

- While the MAGTF G-4 and combat service support element LNO to the MATGT OPT prepare staff estimates, the combat service support

OPT prepares an estimate of supportability consisting of *significant facts*, *required events*, and *conclusions* based on analyzed data. This estimate of supportability is an analysis of logistic factors affecting MAGTF mission accomplishment. The combat service support element logistics planners use these estimates to recommend logistic COAs and develop plans to support the selected MAGTF COA.

- The logistics estimate of supportability uses the six logistics functional areas to integrate the analysis of MAGTF support requirements. It evaluates mission requirements in a detailed document that highlights the capabilities and limitations of the combat service support element. The estimate compares capabilities and requirements. The possible COAs for logistics support should begin to become apparent to the OPT once the estimate of supportability is completed.
- The MAGTF's concept of logistics should reflect the combat service support element's concept of operations and other subordinate force's concepts of logistics to explain how logistic assets will be organized and positioned to execute the mission. It may include the planned employment of unit organic logistics capabilities, combat service support forces, and host nation support. Other considerations include the phasing and shifting of priorities; the focus of effort/priority of work; tasks, responsibilities, and support relationships; organization on the ground; potential displacements; and planned operational pauses.
- If the MAGTF OPT has begun a synchronization matrix as part of its COA development, it can be a very useful tool in completing the COA for logistics support.
- The OPT should produce initial COAs for logistics support and brief them to the combat service support element commander for a rudder check. The COAs could be a multi-site, multi-distribution mode approach to optimizing the throughput capabilities of the combat service support element. As well, they could be single site, single distribution mode approaches to optimizing the throughput capabilities of the combat service support element, or a combination of both options. These approaches generate flexibility and survivability, which ultimately contributes to mission success. Each requires a different allocation of resources and a different level of resource management.
- Since the combat service support element is usually a supporting effort, it will not conduct a relative combat power assessment of the

opposing forces combat service support elements and agencies. It will, however, use the relative combat power assessment of the MAGTF's main effort to better determine support requirements and potential decisive actions or other places or times of anticipated heavy combat.

c. Course of Action War Game

The combat service support element war game evaluates the COAs for logistics support against the MAGTF's COAs to validate logistics estimates of supportability and develop solutions to anticipated support requirements. During the war game the COAs for logistics support are wargamed against each MAGTF COA to determine how to best support the MAGTF concept of operations and scheme of maneuver while integrating the six logistics functions.

- The combat service support OPT should war game the COA for logistics support. It is unlikely that there will be multiple concepts of logistics. The sequence of essential task method is well suited for highlighting the sustainment activities necessary to support planned operations. This technique also allows war gamers to concurrently analyze the essential tasks required to support the MAGTF concept of operations.
- The capabilities of the logistics system are finite and will represent the limit of the means for carrying out any assigned mission. Conditions or measures of effectiveness have to be developed to assess the system, its configuration, and the application of capabilities toward the requirements identified by the supported units.
- The combat service support element has to conduct a war game of its own. It must "what if" logistics risks in the plan and those proposed to support the concept of operations. The synchronization matrix and event matrix, decision support template and matrix from both the MAGTF and the main effort are key to a successful combat service support war game. These tools can highlight critical events to support or critical tasks to execute. The combat service support element OPT should look closely at the MAGTF decision points and ask, "What are the effects of these decision points?" "What actions did they cause the combat service support element to take that are outside the realm of the proposed concept of logistics?"

- The COA should be designed to generate a flexible response. It should provide multiple responses to *unpredictable battlefield developments*. The combat service support element OPT must “what if” the operations plan against unexpected successes or setbacks. These could lead to an unplanned tempo (increased battle rhythm, unexpected resource demands), an unprepared for opportunity for exploitation, or early initiation of pursuit operations. They must “what if” the operations plan against unexpected failures. These could lead to unplanned for and very complex, retrograde operations; delay, withdrawal, or retirement. They must “what if” the operations plan against unexpected emergencies and unpredicted enemy actions.
- The combat service support element war game should build the logistics decision support template and matrix.
- The combat service support OPT must identify logistics branch plans consistent with the potential needs of the supported force.

d. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

The COA chosen by the MAGTF commander will largely drive the combat service support element’s COA for logistics support. Prior to COA comparison and decision, the combat service support element commander must issue his evaluation criteria for his proposed COA for logistics support. The logistics planning factors and the individuals who prepared them have to be available to the MAGTF OPT to justify and explain the factors so the MAGTF commander can make informed decisions about his separate COA. The combat service support element battle staff and OPT must be able to answer any logistics related questions the MAGTF may not be clear on.

- If the combat service support element commander has decided to use a multi-site, multi-distribution mode system, then his comparison and decision is little more than validating the logistics system that will be established to support the MAGTF concept of operations.
- If multiple COAs for logistics support were developed, the commander must choose the one that best optimizes support.
- The combat service support element concept of operations is the COA narrative and graphic that best supports the MAGTF concept of operations. The combat service support element concept of operations provides the details of the logistic system that will be developed to support the other elements of the MAGTF. It also

provides the foundation from which the MAGTF G-4 writes the MAGTF concept of logistics.

e. Orders Development

- The combat service support element OPT must refine and publish its concept of operations for its subordinate, adjacent, and higher units.
- The combat service support element battle staff will contribute to the MAGTF concept of logistics. It will contain the combat service support element's concept of operations along with joint, host nation, aviation combat element, and ground combat element factors. Additionally, they will contribute to the key logistics annexes in the MAGTF order, most notably Annexes D, E, P, and Q.
- The combat service support element must complete and publish its operations order with all the appropriate annexes, appendices, and tabs.

f. Transition

- The combat service support element operations order must be disseminated to all appropriate commands within the MAGTF.
- The combat service support element commander must brief subordinate commanders on the details and requirements of the operations order.
- Conduct a confirmation brief to the MAGTF commander. It is also a good practice to brief the supported unit commander on the combat service support element concept of operation and answer any questions he may have.
- The combat service support element OPT should begin planning for the execution of sequels.

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Appendix C

Tactical Tasks

The following are commonly assigned MAGTF tactical tasks that may be specified, implied, or essential tasks. These tactical tasks define the actions that commanders may take to accomplish their mission. The text in bold are some considerations for planners when developing and assigning tasks.

Examples of enemy oriented tactical tasks include—

- **Ambush.** A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy.
- **Attack by Fire.** Fires (direct and indirect) to destroy the enemy from a distance, normally used when the mission does not require or support occupation of the objective. This task is usually given to the supporting effort during offensive operations and as a counterattack option for the reserve during defensive operations. The assigning commander must specify the intent of fire—destroy, fix, neutralize, or suppress. **[A clear purpose must accompany the assignment of the task attack.]**
- **Block.** To deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or on an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. Units assigned this task may have to retain terrain. **[A force assigned the task of “block” should be assigned the degree of success to be achieved (the size of force to be blocked) and/or a specified time frame in support of its purpose.]**
- **Breach.** To break through or secure a passage through a natural or enemy obstacle. **[A force assigned the task of “breach” should know what size force is to be passed through the breach.]**
- **Bypass.** To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed enemy forces are reported to higher headquarters. **[A unit assigned the task “bypass” should also be given bypass criteria. Bypass criteria is a measure during the**

conduct of an offensive operation established by higher headquarters that specifies the conditions and size under which enemy units and contact may be avoided.]

- **Canalize.** The use of existing or reinforcing obstacles or fires to restrict enemy operations to a narrow zone. **[The tasked unit should be given the physical limits of the narrow zone, the size of the force to be canalized, and desired duration of the task.]**
- **Contain.** To stop, hold, or surround enemy forces, or to keep the enemy in a given area and prevent his withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere.
- **Cover.** Offensive or defensive actions to protect the force from surprise, develop the situation, and give commanders time and space in which to respond to the enemy's actions.
- **Defeat.** To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander's plan and overcome his will to fight, thus making him unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action and yield to the friendly commander's will. **[When assigning the task of defeat, a statement that describes end state conditions should be used to define task completion ("By defeat I mean ...").]**
- **Destroy.** Physically rendering an enemy force combat-ineffective unless it is reconstituted. **[The degree of destruction should be specified in terms of observable enemy capabilities and not simply in terms of numbers and percentages. *Destroy* as an interdiction objective (attack effect) calls for ruining the structure, organic existence, or condition of an enemy target that is essential to an enemy capability (MCRP 3-16A). *Destroy* as a fires effect requires that a target physically be rendered combat ineffective or so damaged that it cannot function unless restored, reconstituted, or rebuilt. Setting automated fire support default values for destruction such as 30% does not guarantee the achievement of the commander's intent; the surviving 70% may still influence the operation. Destruction missions are expensive in terms of time and material. Consider whether neutralization or suppression may be more efficient.]**
- **Disrupt.** To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy's formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause premature commitment or the piecemealing of his forces. **[A force assigned the task "disrupt" should normally be assigned the degree of success to be achieved and/or the duration of the "disruption" in relationship to its purpose. In targeting, we *disrupt* enemy plans**

by precluding effective interaction or the cohesion of enemy combat and combat support systems. In Air Force interdiction doctrine, disrupt forces the enemy into less efficient and more vulnerable dispositions.]

- **Exploit.** Take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gains. Offensive actions that usually follow a successful attack, designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. [A force assigned the task of “exploit” should normally be assigned the degree of success to be achieved and/or the duration of the “exploitation” in relationship to its purpose.]
- **Feint.** An offensive action involving contact with the enemy to deceive him about the location or time of the actual main offensive action.
- **Fix.** To prevent the enemy from moving any part of his forces either from a specific location or for a specific period of time by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. [The size of the force to be fixed, the duration of the task, and where to fix the enemy should be specified.]
- **Guard.** To protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information. [A force is assigned the task to “guard” as one of the tasks in security force operations. Before assigning a unit the task of “guard”, planners should ensure that they specify the scope of the task in terms of time and terrain. A guard force normally operates within the range of the main body's indirect fire weapons.]
- **Interdict.** An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. [A force assigned the task of “interdict” should normally be assigned the degree of success to be achieved (i.e., the effect desired relative to enemy capabilities) and/or the duration of the “interdiction” in relationship to its purpose.]
- **Neutralize.** To render the enemy or his resources ineffective or unusable. [A force assigned the task of “neutralize” will normally be assigned a specific time frame or degree of neutralization to be achieved in relationship to its purpose. Neutralization effects should be described in terms of observable enemy activity. Planners should avoid articulating neutralization effects in terms of numbers or percentages whenever possible. Neutralization fire results in enemy personnel or material becoming incapable of

interfering with an operation or COA. Key questions planners must ask are when and how long does the commander want the target to be neutralized. Most planned fire missions are neutralization fires.]

- **Penetrate.** To break through the enemy's defense and disrupt his defensive system.
- **Protect.** To prevent observation, engagement, or interference with a force or location. **[A force assigned the task "protect" should be assigned the degree of success to be achieved and/or the duration of the "protection" in relationship to its purpose.]**
- **Reconnoiter.** To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy.
- **Rupture.** To create a gap in enemy defensive positions quickly.
- **Screen.** To observe, identify, and report information, and only fight in self-protection. **[A unit assigned the task "screen" may be required to maintain surveillance; provide early warning to the main body; or impede, destroy, and harass enemy reconnaissance within its capability without becoming decisively engaged. The scope of task should be articulated in terms of time and terrain.]**
- **Support by Fire.** Where a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire to support another maneuvering force by either support by fire using overwatch or by establishing a base of fire. The supporting force does attempt to maneuver to capture enemy forces or terrain.

Examples of terrain oriented tactical tasks include—

- **Clear.** The removal of enemy forces and elimination of organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. **[The degree of success to be achieved should be specified by describing what is meant by "organized resistance" (see bypass criteria above).]**
- **Control.** To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over the activities or access in a defined area. **[The area to be controlled and duration of the task should be specified.]**
- **Occupy.** To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other man-made or natural terrain area without opposition, and control the entire area.

[A unit assigned the task “occupy” should be assigned the duration of the “occupation” in relationship to its purpose.]

- **Reconnoiter.** To secure data about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
- **Retain.** To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation or use. [A unit assigned the task of “retain” should be given a specific timeframe in relationship to its purpose.]
- **Secure.** To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. [The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. Conditions should be established that define when a position or terrain feature is “secured.” Usually, conditions can be expressed in terms of observable enemy activity.]
- **Seize.** To clear a designated area and gain control of it. [A unit assigned the task of “seize” will usually have to gain physical possession of a terrain feature from an enemy force. Note that the task “clear” is imbedded within the definition of the task “seize.” See the definition of “clear” for specific planning considerations.]

Examples of friendly force oriented tactical tasks include—

- **Disengage.** To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy cannot observe nor engage the unit by direct fire.
- **Displace.** To leave one position and take another. Forces may be displaced laterally to concentrate combat power in threatened areas.
- **Exfiltrate.** The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control.
- **Follow.** The order of movement of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces in a given combat operation.

In special circumstances, the above tasks may be modified to meet the requirements of METT-T. The commander must clearly state that he is departing from the standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified task with the statement, “What I mean by [modified task] is...”

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Appendix D

Targeting and the Marine Corps Planning Process

During planning, the OPT uses the Marine Corps doctrinal targeting process, D3A (*decide, detect, deliver, and assess*) to develop a concept of fires for each COA. Using D3A, the OPT *decides* which targets to attack and when, determines how to *deliver* the attack on these targets, determines how to *detect* the targets, and determines how to *assess* the fires effort by identifying, in measurable terms, the desired effects of fires on enemy operations. It is important to note that D3A is not conducted separately from the MCPP. D3A is an ongoing process that, when conducted as part of the overall planning effort, ensures the concept of fires is nested within the overall concept of operations.

D-1. Mission Analysis

Mission analysis starts with the commander's orientation, higher headquarters' orders, and IPB. Each of these inputs impacts fires planning in the OPT.

- The commander's orientation provides the commander's initial thoughts on potential friendly and enemy COGs. As part of the *decide* step of D3A, the commander's view of enemy COGs helps to narrow the planners' targeting focus to specific enemy capabilities and units. Guidance on friendly COGs helps to identify enemy capabilities that should be engaged to protect friendly sources of strength.
- As part of the higher headquarters' order, the higher concept of fires outlines the timing, priorities, and effects of fires that support the higher commander's concept of operations. Understanding the higher concept of fires allows the OPT to support and compliment the effects of the higher commander's campaign plan.

- Prior to mission analysis, the IPB sets the stage for the *decide* function of targeting by providing a list of high-value targets for the enemy's most likely, most dangerous, and most advantageous COAs. High-value targets are the assets the enemy commander must have for the successful completion of his mission. The list should be detailed enough to include target capabilities, locations (identified and templated), and combat organization.

In addition to the inputs indicated above, the OPT should also consider the following in mission analysis:

- Where are we relative to the ATO cycle?
- Does the OPT's analysis agree with the commander's initial assessment?
- How does terrain and weather affect the friendly and enemy COGs?
- What are the friendly and enemy critical vulnerabilities?
- *How does the enemy fight his COG?* This includes a detailed analysis of enemy organization for combat, command and control, and doctrinal employment of forces.
- *What are our friendly capabilities?* For example, how many sorties can we generate in 24 hours? How many missions can our organic artillery generate? Do we have adequate collection assets? Do we need to request additional assets to make up for any shortfalls?

D-2. Course of Action Development

Each step of D3A is addressed in COA development. The OPT must identify what enemy formations/capabilities must be engaged (*decide*), develop a collection plan to find them (*detect*), allocate assets to deliver fires (*deliver*), and describe desired effects in tangible terms (*assess*). It is critical that the *entire* OPT participate in developing a concept of fires for *each* COA. By using D3A as a conceptual framework, the OPT ensures that fires are synchronized with both the maneuver and intelligence plans.

The OPT begins developing a concept of fires by examining the high-value targets identified in the IPB process and determining which of these may become high-payoff targets. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the friendly COA to succeed. By analyzing enemy forces (high-value targets) based on their

ability to interfere with or prevent the success of the main effort, the OPT can identify high-payoff targets as well determine target priorities and the sequencing of attacks. Enemy high-value targets that cannot influence the main effort do not become high-payoff targets and the OPT should not allocate friendly assets against them. Answering the following questions will help separate high-payoff targets from high-value targets:

- Can collection assets acquire the high-value target?
- Can the high-value target be attacked with either lethal or non-lethal assets?
- Is the high-value target a *critical node*? A critical node is an element, position, or communications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations.
- Is the attack of the high-value target necessary to the success of the friendly COA?

In addition to identifying high-payoff targets, the OPT must also determine targeting objectives for each COA. In other words, the OPT must describe the desired fires effects on enemy operations. Targeting objectives result from the commander's planning guidance and a METT-T analysis that identifies specific enemy vulnerabilities. If exploited, these vulnerabilities will contribute to the accomplishment of the commander's intent. When stating targeting objectives, the OPT must use proper terminology and describe effects in terms of time, terrain, and/or observable enemy capabilities. MCRP 3-16A, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process*, outlines several targeting objective related terms. When coupled with a specific enemy unit or capability, the following terms become targeting objectives:

- **Limit.** Reduce the options or COAs available to the enemy (e.g., "*Limit the 102nd Armored Brigade's advance to Coastal Highway 1 from H-3 to H+48*").
- **Disrupt.** Prevent the effective interaction or the cohesion of enemy combat and combat support systems (e.g., "*Disrupt 3rd RAG's ability to mass fires at or above the battalion level on LZ DODO from H-Hour to H+36*").
- **Delay.** Alter the time of arrival of forces at a point on the battlefield or the ability of the enemy to project combat power from a point on the battlefield (e.g., "*Delay 10th Mechanized Division's*

reinforcement of coastal defense forces in the vicinity of LF Objectives 1, 2, and 3 until after H+96”).

- **Divert.** Tie up critical enemy resources. Attack of selected targets may cause the enemy commander to divert capabilities or assets from one area or activity to another. Divert reduces the capability of the enemy commander to pursue his plan (e.g., “*As part of the deception operation, divert the I Corps reserve [212th Motorized Rifle Brigade] to Jonesville*”).


The terms *limit*, *disrupt*, *delay*, and *divert* are used to describe the effects of attack on enemy capabilities. They should not be confused with the terms *harass*, *suppress*, *neutralize*, or *destroy*. These terms are used as attack criteria to determine the degree of damage or duration of effects on a specific target (MCRP 3-16A). In other words, *harass*, *suppress*, *neutralize*, and *destroy* describe the intensity of fires required to achieve the desired effect specified by *limit*, *disrupt*, *delay*, and *divert*.

It is critical that the OPT understand the capabilities of all available collection and fire support assets in order to allocate the appropriate systems to identified targeting objectives. Coordination is required when deciding to attack with two different means (such as electronic warfare and aviation). Additionally, the OPT should ensure that the placement of fire support coordination measures facilitate the delivery of fires and the accomplishment of targeting objectives as well as permit the unrestricted maneuver of forces.

To ensure that the development of the concept of fires is an integrated team effort and that fires are synchronized with maneuver and intelligence collection plans, the OPT should have a disciplined methodology for addressing the D3A process as part of COA development. At a minimum, the methodology should:

- Determine where to find and attack high-payoff targets.
- Integrate fires support events or actions with maneuver planning.
- Develop assessment criteria (conditions and measures of effectiveness).
- Assist the G-2 in collection plan refinement.

The following fires worksheet provides a sample methodology for conducting the D3A process in planning.



D-3. Course of Action War Game

During the COA war game, the OPT seeks to:

- Finalize target objectives, high-payoff targets, and target priorities.
- Test the fires plan against enemy COAs.
- Validate and/or refine its concept of fires.

With a good understanding of enemy doctrine, the terrain, and the capabilities of available fires and collection assets, the OPT can test, validate, and/or refine its concept of fires. Moreover, the OPT can anticipate where and when attacks will achieve maximum effects on particular high-payoff targets. These locations become *targeted areas of interest*. The OPT must also determine locations where collection assets can *detect* the high-payoff targets early enough so that they can be attacked at designated targeted areas of interest. These targeted areas for collection assets are named *areas of interest*. Collection assets are then assigned or requested for each named area of interest based on their capability to collect against the anticipated target.

D-4. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, running staff estimates are presented for each COA. In terms of fires, the staff should present an aviation, artillery, and naval surface fire support estimate (as appropriate). The staff estimates should focus on how effectively the friendly unit can detect and attack selected high-payoff targets. This effectiveness can be measured in terms of time, terrain, loss of friendly assets, certainty of target destruction, and end state of friendly forces after the attacks. Once the commander makes his COA decision, the OPT can pass its targeting products to the targeting board (if applicable) to begin the detailed execution planning required by the joint targeting and ATO production cycles.

D-5. Orders Development

The concept of fires associated with the selected COA serves as the basis for the fire support plan. When developing the order, the staff should describe the fires plan from the conceptual level down to the detailed level. The staff should address broad concepts in the basic order, functional plans in Appendix 19 of Annex C, and detailed plans in appropriate tabs. The concept of fires (para. 3.b.(2) of the basic order) and the fire support plan (Appendix 19 to Annex C of the operations order) describes the conceptual and functional “what” and “why” of the fires plan. These functional taskings are then developed in greater detail in the various functional support plans (Air Support Plan [Tab A to Appendix 19 to Annex C], Artillery Support Plan [Tab B to Appendix 19 to Annex C], and Naval Surface Fire Support Plan [Tab C to Appendix 19 to Annex C]). These detailed plans describe how each functional agency will conduct its mission.

D-6. Transition

Transitioning the fire support plan is a challenging and ongoing process because the staff must transition both event-and time-related plans. It is critical that the concept of fires be clearly transitioned to the current fires section as soon as the commander decides on a COA. This is important because the current fires section must begin managing the event-driven concept of fires via the time-driven ATO cycle well before the fire support plan is published. The current fires section must have a complete

understanding of the fire support plan so it can modify the execution of current ATOs to produce the desired effects planned for in the OPT while ensuring that fires remain synchronized with higher and adjacent plans. In other words, the current fires section must continuously update and modify the fire support plan as appropriate during execution to ensure that they are fighting the enemy and not slavishly executing the ATO/plan.

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Appendix E

Planning Quick Reference Table

Warfighting Functions	Maneuver, Intelligence, Logistics, Command and Control, Force Protection, Fires
Center of Gravity	COG is a source of strength (MCDPs & 0-1) COGs may shift by phase or by COA. For example if the enemy is defending, his COG may be artillery; whereas, if the enemy is delaying, his COG maybe his counterattack force—armor. At the tactical level, if the enemy COG does not prevent you from achieving your purpose, then it may not be a COG. Remain focused on the purpose , the attack of the enemy COG is only important if it leads you to that purpose.
Commander's Intent	Purpose, Method, and End State
CCIRS	Information required by the Cdr that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful execution of operational or tactical operations. CCIRs normally result in the generation of three types of information requirements: Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) , Essential Elements Of Friendly Info (EEFI) , Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) . CCIRs should be linked to decisions, assessment criteria's and branch plans.
On-order; Be Prepared Missions	An On-order mission is a mission to be executed , except that the exact time and place may not be known . The force assigned the mission is a committed force, it will develop plans, allocate resources, task organize, and position forces for execution. It must be mentioned in the CONOPS. A Be-prepared mission is a mission assigned that might be executed . It will be executed only if something else has or has not been successful; linked to an event . No resources are allocated for a BPT mission. In the priority of planning, it will be planned after any other assigned on-order missions.
Forms of Maneuver and Types of Operations	Forms of Maneuver: Frontal Attack; Flank Attack; Envelopment (single/double); Turning Movement; Penetration; Infiltration. Types of Offense: Movement to Contact; Attack (hasty, deliberate, spoiling, counterattack, raid, feint, demonstration); Exploitation; Pursuit. Types of Defense: Mobile (orients on the destruction of the enemy through offensive action) and Position Defense (deny enemy access to critical terrain for a specified period of time). Forms of Defensive Maneuver: defend and retrograde. Forms of Retrograde: Delay; Withdrawal (under pressure and not under pressure); Retirement. Forms of Reconnaissance: Zone; Area; Point; Route; Reconnaissance in Force. Forms of Security: Screen (observe and report); Guard (T/O to operate apart and protect the main force); Cover (prevent surprise and deceive the enemy).
Defense Operations	Security area (FLOT [no screening or guard forces forward of—should have a BHL for these forces]—FEBA [area where ground combat units are deployed, excluding screening and covering forces]). Main Battle Area (FEBA—Rear Boundary of forward subordinate units). Rear Area (area forward from the assigned rear boundary to the rear boundary of the main battle area). Position Defense: Denies the enemy access to terrain. Mobile Defense: Orients on the enemy force. Defend in sector or battle position. Task Organized Counterattack Force and Reserves.
Phases/Stages/Parts	Name each in sequence (e.g., Pre-Hostilities, Lodgment, Shaping, Combat Operations, Decisive Ops, Exploitation, Stabilization, Follow Through, Post-Hostilities, Redeployment). Each stage should have an end state or conditions that determine transition to the next phase or stage.
Amphibious Operations	Types: Assault, Demonstration, Raid, Withdrawal. Assault Forces and Assault Follow on Echelon. PERMA: Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, Assault. Considerations: Mission (Purpose of amphibious assault – fix, deceive, or fight in depth, are operations sequenced or simultaneous), Objectives, who is the CATF and does he have the ability to control the AOA, if established. If no AOA how and who controls the battlespace. AOA (immature theater) / AO (mature theater), Command Relations, Air Control, Supporting Ops, Boundaries, Linkup, Deception, Pre-Assault Ops, Advance Force Ops, MPF, Logistics (AFLAOT or JLOTS). What are the conditions for transfer of authority ashore. Is NAVFOR the supported or supporting commander during execution of the amphibious operation? Advance Force Operations (Org within the ATF that precedes to prepare the objective area—recon, mines...), Pre-Assault Operations (conducted in objective area before the assault phase begins by the ATF forces), Supporting Operations (Coordinated by the CATF to shape the enemy by joint forces—deception, battlespace dominance, mines outside the AOA, MIO, special operations). SHIPS: LPD1: (700 Marines, 1 LCAC, 2 Helo spot—2 CH46s), LPD4: (650 Marines, 1LCAC, 2 Helo spot—4 CH 46s), LSD36: (350 Marines, 2/3 LCAC, 1 Helo spot 1—0 CH 46s), LSD41: (400 Marines, 4 LCAC, 2 Helo spot—0 CH 46s), LSD49: (400 Marines, 2 LCAC, 2 Helo spot—0 CH 46s), LHD1: (1800 Marines, 3 LCAC, 9 Helo spot —42 CH 46s), LHA: (1800 Marines, 1 LCAC, 9 Helo spot—43 CH46s), LCC-19, Blue Ridge Command Ship (200 Marines, 1 Helo spot). 5-inch Guns: 22,000k HE, WP, illumination.

MOOTW	Principles: Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. Types: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities, Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, NEOs, Peace Operations (Peace Enforcement, Peace Keeping Operations, Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts), Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, Support to Insurgency.
Linkup Operations	Conducted during an amphibious operation by forces landed by surface or aviation means, relief of an isolated unit. May be conducted to complete an encirclement of envelopment of an enemy force, join an attacking force with a force inserted in the enemy rear. Assist in the breakout of an encircled friendly force. Forces may be moving towards each other, or may be stationary. May be part of an offensive or defensive operation. HQ directing the linkup must establish the command relationships and responsibilities of the forces involved. Liaison is established through planning and continues throughout the operation. Coordinate the scheme of maneuver and control measures. Location of primary and alternate linkup points. Fire support measures increase or decrease as the forces converge. Actions following the linkup. G2 must employ R/S assets near linkup points. Axis of advance of the moving force must intersect the security element of the stationary force. Stationary force removes obstacles, provides guides, and establishes assembly areas for the reorganization of the linkup forces. A restrictive fire line (RFL) may be required to preclude fires from the convergence of forces affecting each other. As the linkup become imminent, the RFL is moved as close to the stationary force as possible to allow maximum freedom of action for the linkup force (moving force should control fires). Both FSCCs should clear fires not observed or under terminal control. Upon linkup, responsibility for fire support is transferred to the designated commander. If the linkup force is to continue operations with the stationary force, then a single commander for the overall force must be designated. FM 71-100 Div Ops
Obstacle Crossing	Natural or Manmade. Hasty or Deliberate. Suppress, Obscure, Secure, and Reduce. Support Force to isolate the objective, Breach force creates lanes within the obstacle belt. Assault force dislodges the enemy. M-155 MICLIC: 100m x 16m. Expect 50% equipment loss for the breach force. Mechanical Reduction 10 minutes per 100m minefield.
Passage of Lines	Must facilitate another tactical operation. Conducted to continue and attack, envelop an enemy force, pursue a fleeing enemy, or withdraw a security force from the main battle force area. Use multiple passage lanes. Should be rapid to minimize vulnerability. Stationary unit conducts aggressive counter recon. Engineer support from stationary unit to guide the passing force through obstacles along the FLOT. Control measure (Battle Handover Line, Axis of Advance, Rearward Assembly Areas). Passing unit FSC coordinates the fires. Stationary unit assists in CASEVAC, EPWs, civilian control, route priority and traffic control. Higher command coordinates responsibility of control of zone or sector or mutually agreed by stationary and passing commanders. Deception and smoke are planned. Combat support is integrated into the plan to support the movement of the passing unit. Route priority is given to the passing unit. Exchange intelligence, tactical plans, SOPs, security measure during passage, priorities of route and facilities and provisions for movement control, exchange of LNOs, and obstacle plan.
Relief in Place	Can be conducted simultaneously over the entire sector or staggered over time. Executed from front to back or back to front, given METT-T and the amount of forces employed along the FLOT (minimum forces along the FLOT, relief rear to front and vice versa). Time of relief, sequence of units, advance parties, fire support coordination, air defense, passage control (initially unit being relieved has TACON upon relieving unit, exchange of equipment...).
Maritime Prepositioning	Secure area with adequate ports (drafts, overhead clearance, and throughput [roads...]), and adequate strategic airlift. One MPSRON supports a brigade size MAGTF force of approx. 18,800 Marines and sailors for 30 days. All classes of supplies except IV, VI and X. MPSRON-1 Mediterranean Sea, MPSRON-2 Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), MPSRON-3 Pacific Ocean (Guam). M1A1: 58; LAVs: 25; AAVs: 109; HMMWVs: 129 (72 w/TOW), Stingers: 45; ROWPUs: 41; Trucks (5 ton): 489, MHE: 121; 30 days sustainment. Sorties for MEF (Fwd) Fly in Echelon: CMD (CE) 12; GCE 35; CSSE 30; ACE 151. Naval Support Element (NSE) 6. Offload 7-9 days dependent on ship type. Backload 9-10 days.
Rear Operations	Functions: Communications, Intelligence, Movement, Area Management, Security, Sustainment, Infrastructure Development, HN Support. Dedicate intelligence assets to rear area.. Today's deep fight may be tomorrow's rear area. MACE CG generally assigned as the RAC (rear area commander/ordinator). Reserve Regt assigned as the TCF. Levels: 1. (Agents, terrorists, saboteurs....) Threat can be defeated by base/base cluster self-defense. 2. (Small tactical units, unconventional forces....) Beyond base self-defense capability but can be defeated by response forces (MP) with supporting arms. 3. (Large tactical units—air/heliborne, amphibious....) Requires commitment of combined arms tactical combat forces (TCF). Active and Passive Defensive Measures. SROE and LNO to FOPS. If FSSG is the RAC than they must have assets assigned for fire coordination and security
IPB	Doctrinal Template: Enemy Order of Battle. Situation Template: Enemy based on terrain and environment. Event Template: NAI with EN COA for developing a collection plan. Combined Event Template: Red and Blue Forces COA. Decision Support Template: A product of war gaming, projected EN COA with DPs/NAI/TAI. MCOD: Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay; mobility corridors, objectives avenues of approach, likely location of EN obstacle system, defensible terrain, likely engagement area, key terrain, built up areas & civil infrastructure, etc. HVT: Essential for the enemy to accomplish the mission. Developed by the G-2. HPT: Enemy targets, when destroyed, help us accomplish the mission. Developed by the G-3.
Information Operations	IO includes: Deception, Psychological Operations, Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare, Operational Security, Civil Affairs. Defensive IO methods include: OPSEC, Information Assurance, CI, Counter PSYOPS, and Counter Deception.

MOPP Conditions	1: Over garment worn, carry the rest of the protective gear. 2: Wear boots. 3: Protective mask and hood. 4: Gloves and liners, over garment is closed and hood pulled down. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology MOPP suit lasts 30 days and 24 hrs contaminated. Account for a factor of 1.5 longer to accomplish tasks under MOPP conditions. FM 3-4, NBC Protection.
Air Defense Weapons Control Status	Weapons Free: Weapons fired at any target not positively recognized as friendly. Weapons Tight: Fired at targets recognized as hostile. Weapons Hold: Fired in self-defense.
Levels of Authority	COCOM: non-transferable command authority established by law. OPCON: transferable authority to accomplish assigned missions; does not include authority for logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. TACON: local direction to accomplish assigned tasks. ADCON: administrative and logistics. DS: Support another force and to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. GS: Support given to the supported force as a whole and not any subdivision thereof. GSR: Arty mission, support the force as whole while providing reinforcing fires for another arty unit. Attached: Temporary placement of units or personnel in an organization. Mutual Support and Close Support
LNOs, Representatives, and Augmentees	Liaisons: represent the sending unit's capabilities, plans, and concerns. He must be able to understand how his commander thinks, and convey his commander's intent, mission, concept of operations, and concerns. LNOs should have the requisite rank, authority, clearances, and communication connectivity to function properly. LNOs should have the depth in personnel to conduct sustained operations. Representatives: Work for the sending unit and provide short term, as required input into the planning process. They are expected to be the SME for the function they represent. Augmentees: Work for the receiving commander or staff and usually fill an MOS/TE shortfall requirement for the gaining unit.
Fire Support	FSCL: Established by the land or amphibious commander to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems. Must be coordinated with appropriate air commander (keep in mind the ATO cycle its impact to rapidly change FSCLs). Supporting elements may fire beyond without coordination but should inform appropriate ground commander. Coordination required behind the line. CFL: A line beyond which conventional surface fire support means may fire at any time without additional coordination. RFL: Established between two converging forces, by the next higher common commander. RFA: Fires that exceed imposed restrictions may not be delivered without approval.
Days, Hours	C-day: deployment to commence; D-day: commencement of hostilities; R-day: redeployment; S-day: 200,000 selected reserve to active duty for 90 days; T-day: National Emergency 1,000,000 reserve callup for 24 months; W-day: hostile government may commence operations. Hours: H: commencement of operation on D-day; L: hour at which deployment commences on C-day. (ref: JP1-02, under Time)
DEFCON 1-5	DEFCON 5 being normal while DEFCON 1 being maximum readiness of military forces.
Collaborative Planning Systems	GCCS: Global Command and Control System. JDISS: Joint Deployable Intelligence System (fed by GCCS requires SIPRNET). JMCIS/UB: Joint Maritime Command Information System/Unified Build. IAS: Intelligence Analysis System. TCO: Tactical Combat Operations. C2PC: Command and Control Personal Computer. CTAPS: Contingency Theatre Automated Planning System. TBMCs: Theater Battle Management Core Systems (Replacing CTAPS). AFTADS: Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Systems. TMS: Target Management System. JOTS: Joint Operational Tactical System. JOTS 1 (TDBM): Track Database Manager. COP: Common Operating Picture (CINC). CTP: Common Tactical Picture (Component and Below). DII COE: Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment.
Weapons Systems	MIAI: 300 miles (505 gal: 300 miles), weight 70 tons, range 120mm--3,000m, 14 per company; T-72: max range 2000m; M2 BFV: 300 miles (175 gal) 25mm chain gun 14 per company; TOW: 3750; Hellfire: 7000; Longbow 20K; Javelin: 2,000; 60mm Mortar 3,500; 81mm Mortar 5,800; 105mm Arty 14,000; 155mm Arty 18,000 Rap 30,000; MLRS 32K -100K(ATACMS); Stinger missile: 15000m; Patriot: 160 km; Hawk: 80 km; JSTARS: approx. 200miles by 200miles coverage. TLAM: 1,000 lb warhead; JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munitions - Satellite Guided.
Armor Division	Total Vehicles 5,314. If the Div moves without DISCOM it requires 662 Km on one route. With DISCOM 729 km. (Ref CGSC ST 100-3).
Armored Cavalry Regt	2d ACR -- Light UH-60: 10; OH-58: 33; HMMWV TOWS: 108; HMMWV SCOUT: 180; 155mm Towed: 24; 120mm Mortar: 18; 3rd ACR -- Heavy M1A1: 123; CFV M3: 125; CEV: 3; Javelin: 24; Mortar 120mm: 18; OH-58: 24; AH64: 16; EH60: 3; UH60: 18; Avenger: 6; Stinger: 10; 155mm SP: 24
USMC Tank Battalion	Bn: M1A1: 58 (66-72 tons). Co 14 x 4 (12 M88A1 Rs & 6 AVLBs, 4 M60A1 Bridge Armored vehicle). 5-Tons: 38; TOW HMMWV: 26
LAR Bn	LAV 25: 60; LAVC2: 8; LAV-AT: 16; LAV-M: 8; LAV-L: 16; LAV-R: 6; TOTAL 114. 5-Ton: 13; LVS: 3; Wrecker: 2; HMMWV: 24 LAR CO: LAV 25: 14; LAV-M: 2; LAV-T: 4; LAVC2: 1; LAV-R: 1; LAV-L: 3 CO 25 x 4 Weight 28,000lbs empty; CH53E carries 30,000lbs 50 miles.
AAV Bn	AAVP7s: 213. AAVC7s: 14; AAVR7s: 6. Bn = 4 AAV Cos. CO: 44Ps; 3Cs; 1R. CO D in 29 Palms. Combat Assault Bn in Okinawa has 1 AAV CO
Air Defense	Patriot: 160 km. Patriot Radar Alt 80K, Acquisition Range 160K. Engagement Range 60K. Should be employed no more than 20K from unit. Mutual Support 15K. BN: 5 Btry; 8 Launchers per Btry; 32 Missiles per Btry. AVENGER Acquisition Range 10K; Engagement Range 5K. Mutual Support Distance 3K. 8 Missiles per vehicle. Stinger Missile: 15000m. Hawk: 80 km.

Intelligence Collection Platforms	Rivet Joint: Communications Intelligence and Electronic Intelligence. Quickfix: EH 60 – Tactical Communication Intelligence and Electronic Intelligence; DF and Electronic attack in low frequency spectrums. Compass Call: Jammer. Commando Solo: C-130 – Psychological operations and broadcaster.
Tactical Ballistic Missiles	SCUD B: Range:300K, Payload:2,200lbs, CEP: 400 to 1000m, Warhead: Conv/Chem. SCUD C: Range:500K, Payload:1,500 lbs, CEP: 400 to 1000m, Warhead: Conv/Chem. Nodong 1: Range:1000K, Payload:2,200lbs, Warhead: Conv/Chem. Nodong 2: Range:1500 - 2000K, Payload:2,200lbs, Warhead: Conv/Chem. M18: Range:1000K, Payload:880lbs. M9: Range: 600K, Payload:1100lbs, CEP: 300m, Warhead: Conv. CSS-2/DF-3: Range:3000K, Payload:3000lbs, CEP: 1000m, Warhead: Conv/Nuc. Jericho 1 (Israel): Range:500K, Payload:1,100lbs, Warhead: Conv/Chem. Frog 7: Range:70K, Payload:960lbs, CEP: 400m, Warhead: Conv/Chem. Sakr-80 (Egypt): Range:80K, Payload:440lbs, Warhead: Conv. Vector (Egypt): Range: 600K, Payload:1000lbs, Warhead: Conv. BGM – 109 TOMAHAWK: Range:1300K, Payload:1000lbs, CEP: 10m, Warhead: Conv/Nuc. (Ref CGSC ST 100-3).
Attack Helicopters	AH1: Missiles: 8/ 20mm, Range: 480k; AH64: Missiles: 16/30mm, Range: 480k—aux tanks 800k; OH58: Missiles: 4/.50cal, Range:413k. (Ref CGSC ST 100-3).
Utility Helicopter	UH60: Troop: 13 (20 without seats), Range: 592K, Internal:2,600lbs, External: 8000lbs. CH47: Troop: 33 (100 without seats), Range: 717K, Internal:20,200lbs, External: 30,000lbs. CH53E: Troop: 35 (55 with center seats), Range: 620m, refueling – Indefinite, Internal:31,000lbs, External: 33,000lbs. CH53D: Troop: 35 (55 with center seats), Range: 690m, takeoff weight: 19,000lbs. CH46: Troop: 14 (24 combat), Range: 190K, Internal:2,600lbs, External: 8000lbs. UH1: Troop: 9, Range: 200K, Internal:2,600lbs, External: 8000lbs. (Ref CGSC ST 100-3).
Functions of Marine Aviation	Offensive Air Support (CAS and DAS); Antiair Warfare (Offensive AAW and Air Defense); Assault Support; Air Reconnaissance; Electronic Warfare; Control of Aircraft and Missiles
Functions of Logistics	Supply; Maintenance; Transportation; General Engineering; Health Services; Other Services (Legal, Exchange, Food, Disbursing, Postal, Billeting, Religious, Mortuary, and Morale and Recreation Services)
Classes of Supply	I Rations, II Individual Equipment, III POL, IV Construction, V Ammunition, VI Sundry Items, VII Major End Items, VIII Medical/Dental, IX Repair parts, X Materials for Non-Military Programs.

Appendix F

War Game Sequence Worksheet

Notes for the OPT facilitator:

1. Ensure decision support matrix and template are maintained.
2. Ensure the recorders capture the information before proceeding to the next turn.
3. Review commander's evaluation criteria and ensure the data relevant to it is captured.
4. Maintain an operational timeline and identify friction that may impact the commander's single battle.
5. Consider warfighting functions across close, deep, and rear operations.
6. Ensure the war game participants bring all necessary material and information.
7. Ensure the OPT leader participates to arbitrate disputes.

1. **Start Turn.** Brief the current time and weather in the operations for this turn.
2. **Red Cell.** Enemy lay down with task; purpose; desired effects on blue forces; and end state/condition of each unit expected to be employed during the turn.
3. **Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units.** Missions and actions during the turn.
4. **MEF.** Overall mission/concept of operations with deep, close, rear, security, decision actions, shaping actions, and sustainment.
 - Boundaries (if applicable).
 - Fire support coordination measures in effect.
5. **Intelligence.** Cover close, deep, and rear operations.
 - MEF.
 - High-value target list.
 - Reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
 - Active named areas of interest.
 - Divisions.
 - Reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
 - Active named areas of interest.
 - Aircraft Wing.
 - Reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
 - Active named areas of interest.
6. **Maneuver.** Task and purpose; desired effects on enemy and end state or condition of each unit.
 - Division.
 - Engineer:
 - Mobility.
 - Countermobility.
 - Survivability.
 - Aircraft wing (combat assault transport).
7. **Fires.** Cover close, deep, and rear operations.
 - Targeting objectives and priorities (task, purpose, method, effects).
 - High-payoff targets.
 - Marine aviation.
 - Artillery.

- Naval surface fire support.
- Joint (joint ATO in effect).
- Targeting issues:
 - Non-lethal.
 - Limited/protected.

6. **Logistics.** Cover close, deep, and rear operations.

- Fixing.
- Arming.
- Fueling.
- Sustaining.
- Manning.
- Moving.

7. **Command and Control**

- Additional CCIRs.
- Command post locations.
- Rear area operations (Collection plan for rear area threats).
- Information Operations/C2W:
 - OPSEC.
 - Public Affairs.
 - PSYOPS.
 - Civil Affairs.
 - EW.
- Movement control.

8. **Force Protection**

- Air defense status/locations.
- NBCD posture/locations.
- Protection of friendly high value assets.

9. **Red Cell.** Enemy reaction.

10. **Blue Forces.** Counter-action (repeat list above by exception).

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Appendix G

Glossary

Section I Acronyms

Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes, and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
 2. MCRP 5-12C, *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
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AO	area of operations
ATO	air tasking order
C2PC	Command and Control Personal Computer
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CBAE	commander's battlespace area analysis
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
D3A	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FRAGO	fragmentary order
IOC	intelligence operations center
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

LNO	liaison officer
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning System
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available
MOS	military occupational specialty
MSTP	MAGTF Staff Training Program
NIPRNET	Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network
OPORD	operation order
OPT	operational planning team
RFI	request for information
ROC	rehearsal of concept
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOP	standing operating procedures

Section II Definitions

Note: Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes, and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military definitions of military terms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
 2. MCRP 5-12C, *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
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B

branch(es)—A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the operations based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

C

centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02)

commander's battlespace area evaluation—A methodology that supports the entire planning and decisionmaking process by aiding the commander in the visualization, development, assessment, integration, translation, and final transmission of knowledge to the staff and planning team. Also called **CBAE**. (MCRP 5-12C)

commander's critical information requirements—Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called **CCIR**. **Note:** CCIRs are normally divided into three primary subcategories: priority

intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information. (MCRP 5-12C)

course of action—1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called **COA**. (JP 1-02)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called **CV**. (MCRP 5-12C)

I

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—(See joint Pub 1-02.) In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (MCRP 5-12C)

J

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System—A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. JOPES includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and

sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called **JOPES**. (JP 1-02)

O

operational planning team—A group built around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the six warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called **OPT**. (MCRP 5-12C)

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